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   Sexual	  assault	   is	  a	  major	  problem	   in	  every	  branch	  of	   the	  American	  Armed	  
Forces.	  The	  current	  military	   justice	  system	   is	   flawed	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	  deny	  
victims	   of	   sexual	   assault	   in	   the	   military	   meaningful	   and	   competent	   justice.	  
Victims	  of	   sexual	   assault	   in	   the	  military	   do	  not	   receive	   the	   same	  due	  process	  
that	   their	   civilian	   counterparts	   receive.	   The	   bottom	   line	   is	   that	   our	   service-­‐
members	   deserve	   more	   than	   the	   current	   military	   justice	   system	   provides	  
because	   service-­‐members	   leave	   their	   loved	   ones	   and	   homes	   to	   fight-­‐-­‐
sometimes	   never	   to	   return-­‐-­‐	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   our	   homeland	   and	   promote	  
American	  justice	  and	  democracy	  abroad.	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  military	   justice	  system’s	  many	  failures	   is	  the	   lack	  of	  procedural	  
protections	   in	   pretrial	   probable	   cause	   determination	   (Article	   32)	   hearings.	  
Unlike	   the	   closed-­‐door	   civilian	   grand	   jury	   proceedings,	   which	   do	   not	   allow	  
defense	  counsel	   to	  attend,	  Article	  32	  hearings	  are	  public,	  and	  defendants	  are	  
legally	  entitled	  to	  thoroughly	  cross-­‐examine	  government	  witnesses.	  While	  rape	  
shield	   protections	   are	   supposed	   to	   prevent	   many	   of	   the	   abuses	   that	   have	  
occurred,	   the	   protections	   have	   not	   been	   competently	   enforced.	   Two	   laws	  
applicable	  in	  Article	  32	  hearings	  completely	  contradict	  each	  other,	  resulting	  in	  
an	   impediment	   of	   important	   procedural	   protections.	   However,	   if	   the	  military	  
justice	  system	  is	  amended	  and	  the	  rape	  shield	  laws	  are	  properly	  followed,	  many	  
injustices,	   i.e.,	  the	  fall	  2014	  Maryland	  Naval	  Academy	  pretrial	  hearing,	  will	  be	  
averted.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   rape	   shield	   problem,	   the	   National	   Defense	  
Authorization	  Act	  (“NDAA”)	  of	  2014	  did	  not	  create	  laws	  prohibiting	  the	  use	  of	  
non-­‐legally	   trained	   investigating	   officers	   in	   all	   situations.	   Additionally,	   even	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though	  NDAA	  2014	  amended	  the	  “availability”	  options	  for	  Article	  32	  witnesses	  
by	   giving	   witnesses	   the	   legal	   right	   to	   not	   attend	   the	   hearing	   in	   certain	  
circumstances,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   loophole	   that	   allows	  defense	   counsel	   to	  depose	  
and	   thoroughly	   cross-­‐examine	   key	   government	   witnesses.	   Most	   importantly,	  
the	  deposition	  officer	  charged	  with	  overseeing	  the	  deposition	  is	  not	  required	  to	  
rule	  on	  objections	  or	  to	  possess	  any	  legal	  training.	  	  	  	  
Some	  victims	   fed	  up	  with	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  military	   justice	   system	  are	  
turning	  to	  federal	  district	  courts—desperate	  for	  relief	  and	  crying	  for	  help.	  While	  
district	   courts	   are	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   allegations,	   the	   courts	   do	   not	   have	   the	  
legal	  ability	  to	  provide	  redress	  for	  the	  victims.	  Finally,	  although	  NDAA	  2014	  was	  
not	   as	   revolutionary	   as	   Senator	   Gillibrand’s	   proposed	   Military	   Justice	  
Improvement	  Act,	  it	  still	  passed	  several	  key	  improvements.	  It	  is	  a	  positive	  half-­‐
step	  forward.	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I.	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	  
	  
No	   one	  will	   believe	   you,	   and	   even	   if	   someone	   did	   believe	   you,	  
you	  have	  a	  long	  road	  ahead.	  You	  came	  overseas	  to	  fight	  for	  your	  country,	  
for	  something	  you	  believe	  in,	  and	  for	  something	  bigger	  than	  yourself.	  You	  
spend	  your	  nights	  away	   from	  your	   loved	  ones,	  while	   they	   live	  out	   their	  
lives	   at	   home	   without	   you.	   One	   night	   something	   tragic	   happens.	  
Something	  you	  never	  thought	  would	  happen	  to	  you.	  You	  become	  one	  of	  
the	  many	  service	  members	  who	  are	  sexually	  assaulted	  every	  single	  day	  in	  
the	   military.1	   You,	   someone	   minding	   your	   own	   business	   on	   your	   walk	  
back	   to	   the	   barracks,	   got	   knocked	   over	   the	   head	   from	   behind	   with	   a	  
metal	  pipe	  and	  subsequently	  blacked	  out.	  You	  wake	  up,	  not	  realizing	  you	  
are	  bound	  at	  your	  hands	  and	  feet.	  Then	  the	  beating	  starts.	  You	  are	  raped	  
and	  told	  you	  will	  be	  killed	  if	  you	  open	  your	  mouth.2	  
The	   next	   day	   it	   hits	   you.	   You	   were	   raped	   last	   night.	   You	   feel	  
disassociated	   from	  yourself,	   a	   sort	   of	   numb	  depression	   you	  have	  never	  
felt	  before.	  You	  are	  too	  embarrassed	  to	  talk	  to	  anyone	  about	  it.	  You	  feel	  
resentment	   toward	   the	  military	   establishment,	   and	   resentment	   toward	  
yourself	   for	   having	   such	   naïve	   preconceptions	   of	   people	   and	   justice.	  
What	   happened	   to	   you	  personally	   goes	   against	   everything	   you	   thought	  
you	   knew	   about	   the	   glory	   and	   the	   fraternal	   nature	   of	   military	   service.	  
Feeling	   violated	   and	   angry,	   you	   talk	   to	   one	   of	   your	   peers,	   who	  
encourages	  you	  to	  file	  a	  report	  with	  military	  law	  enforcement.	  	  
You	   don’t	   want	   to	   make	   it	   a	   big	   deal.	   Why	   would	   you	   want	  
everyone	  talking	  about	  you?	  Your	  anger	  grows.	  Finally,	  you	  file	  a	  report	  
with	  law	  enforcement.	  At	  your	  Article	  32	  hearing3,	  where	  your	  superiors	  
determine	  if	  there	  is	  enough	  evidence	  to	  court-­‐martial	  the	  accused,	  you	  
are	   vigorously,	   in	   an	   almost	   hazing	   like	   fashion,	   asked	   disgusting	   and	  
                                                
1	  Jackie	  Speier,	  Why	  Rapists	  in	  Military	  Get	  Away	  With	  It,	  CNN	  OPINION	  (June	  21,	  
2012,	  8:19	  AM	  EDT),	  http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/opinion/speier-­‐military-­‐
rape/.	  The	  statistics	  cited	  in	  this	  article	  were	  compiled	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  
Defense	  and	  presented	  to	  Congress	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Sexual	  Assault	  
Prevention	  &	  Response	  Office	  (“SAPRO”),	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Annual	  Report	  on	  
Sexual	  Assault	  in	  the	  Military:	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012,	  (2013)	  (hereinafter	  “2012	  SAPRO	  
Report	  ”)).	  See	  http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/annual-­‐reports.	  	  
2	  Michael	  F.	  Matthews,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  The	  Untold	  Story	  of	  Military	  Sexual	  Assault,	  N.Y.	  
TIMES	  (November	  25,	  2013),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/opinion/the-­‐untold-­‐story-­‐of-­‐military-­‐sexual-­‐
assault.html#.	  
3	  See	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832	  (2014).	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  Where	  is	  The	  Justice?	  	  	   298	  298	  
embarrassing	  questions	  about	  your	  sexual	  habits,	  including	  whether	  you	  
invited	  the	  alleged	  sexual	  assault	  because	  you	  did	  not	  wear	  underwear,	  
and	  how	  wide	  you	  opened	  your	  mouth	  while	  performing	  oral	  sex.4	  All	  the	  
while,	  your	  peer,	  the	  one	  who	  you	  trusted	  and	  confided	  with,	  is	  testifying	  
on	  the	  stand	  saying	  none	  of	  what	  you	  said	  actually	  happened.	  Now	  it	   is	  
your	  chance	  to	  testify	  and	  you	  cringe	  into	  a	  tight	  little	  ball,	  as	  you	  start	  to	  
relive	  what	  happened	  as	  you	   testify.	  You	   feel	  a	  horrific	  wave	  of	  anxiety	  
overcome	  you	  as	  you	  make	  eye	  contact	  with	  your	  peers	  and	  realize	  that	  
once	  you	  testify,	  you	  are	  an	  outsider.	  Your	  mind	  begins	  to	  race.	  You	  think	  
about	   how	   you	   rely	   on	   your	   military	   employment	   for	   important	  
government	   benefits,	   that	   you	   would	   feel	   dishonored	   if	   you	   were	  
discharged	   from	  the	  armed	  services,	  and	  how	  much	  you	  value	  your	   job	  
security.	   Are	   you	   going	   to	   inculpate	   one	   of	   your	   brothers	   or	   sisters,	   in	  
front	  of	  anyone?	  Is	  anyone	  going	  to	  believe	  you?	  Will	  you	  be	  ostracized	  
and	   retaliated	   against?5	   Can’t	   the	   commander	   disregard	   any	   verdict	  
against	  the	  accused?6	  	  
The	   aforementioned	   hypothetical7	   illustrates	   something	   wrong	  
with	   our	   military	   justice	   system.	   Consider	   the	   following	   facts	   and	  
statistics.	  	  If	  you	  serve	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Military	  and	  you	  rape	  or	  sexually	  assault	  
a	   fellow	   service	  member,	   chances	   are	   you	  won’t	   be	   punished.8	   In	   fact,	  
you	  have	  an	  estimated	  86.5%	  chance	  of	  keeping	  your	  crime	  a	  secret	  and	  
                                                
	  
4	  See	  Jennifer	  Steinhauer,	  2	  Face	  Court-­‐Martial	  in	  Naval	  Academy	  Assault	  Case,	  N.Y.	  
TIMES	  (October	  10,	  2013),	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/2-­‐ex-­‐navy-­‐
football-­‐players-­‐face-­‐court-­‐martial-­‐in-­‐rape-­‐case.html?_r=0	  (hereinafter	  “Steinhauer	  
1”);	  Jennifer	  Steinhauer,	  Navy	  Hearing	  in	  Rape	  Case	  Raises	  Alarm,	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  
(September	  20,	  2013),	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/us/intrusive-­‐grilling-­‐
in-­‐rape-­‐case-­‐raises-­‐alarm-­‐on-­‐military-­‐hearings.html?ref=us	  (hereinafter	  “Steinhauer	  2”).	  	  
5	  Common	  reasons	  for	  victim’s	  not	  reporting	  include:	  (1)	  the	  belief	  that	  nothing	  
would	  be	  done;	  (2)	  fear	  of	  ostracism,	  harassment,	  or	  ridicule	  by	  peers;	  and	  (3)	  the	  
belief	  that	  their	  peers	  would	  gossip	  about	  the	  incident.	  See	  AZ	  v.	  Shinseki,	  731	  F.3d	  
1303,	  1312-­‐14	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)	  (citing	  Gov't	  Accountability	  Office,	  GAO–08–
1013T,	  Military	  Personnel:	  Preliminary	  Observations	  on	  DoD's	  and	  the	  Coast	  Guard's	  
Sexual	  Assault	  Prevention	  and	  Response	  Programs	  14	  (2008)).	  
6	  R.	  CHUCK	  MASON,	  CONG.	  RESEARCH	  SERV.,	  R41739,	  MILITARY	  JUSTICE:	  COURTS-­‐MARTIAL,	  AN	  
OVERVIEW	  at	  8	  (Aug.	  12,	  2013)	  (citing	  Art.	  60,	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  860;	  RCM	  1107).	  
7	  This	  hypothetical	  was	  created	  based	  on	  facts	  taken	  from	  the	  sources	  cited	  in	  
footnotes	  1,	  2,	  4,	  5,	  and	  from	  Jesse	  Ellison,	  The	  Military’s	  Secret	  Shame,	  NEWSWEEK,	  
(Apr.	  3,	  2011),	  http://www.newsweek.com/militarys-­‐secret-­‐shame-­‐66459.	  
8	  See	  Speier,	  supra	  note	  1.	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a	  92%	  chance	  of	  avoiding	  a	  court-­‐martial.9	  Service	  members	  who	  report	  
being	  sexually	  assaulted	  by	  a	  commanding	  officer	  or	  military	  colleague	  do	  
so	   at	   their	   own	   peril.10	   They	   face	   ridicule,	   demotion,	   investigation	   that	  
includes	  a	  review	  of	  their	  sexual	  history	  and	  even	  involuntary	  discharge.11	  
A	   Department	   of	   Defense	   report	   released	   in	  May	   2013	   estimated	   that	  
there	  were	  26,000	  instances	  of	  unwanted	  sexual	  contact	  in	  the	  military	  in	  
2012,	   an	   increase	   of	   35%	   compared	   with	   2010.12	   The	   Department	   of	  
Defense	   estimates	   that	   between	   2006	   and	   2012,	   fewer	   than	   15%	   of	  
military	   sexual	   assault	   victims	   reported	   the	   assault	   to	   a	   military	  
authority.13	  There	  were	  3,553	   sexual	  assault	   complaints	   reported	   in	   the	  
first	  three	  quarters	  of	  this	  fiscal	  year	  (2013),	  a	  nearly	  50%	  increase	  over	  
the	  same	  period	  a	  year	  earlier.14	  Of	  the	  3,553	  sexual	  assault	  complaints,	  
fewer	  than	  500	  were	  brought	  to	  trial	  and	  200	  resulted	  in	  a	  conviction.15	  
Additionally,	   according	   to	   The	   Invisible	   War,	   a	   2012	   documentary	  
detailing	  the	  gravitas	  of	  the	  sexual	  assault	  crisis	   in	  the	  military16,	  a	  Navy	  
study	   conducted	   anonymously	   reported	   that	   15%	   of	   incoming	   recruits	  
had	  attempted	  or	  committed	  rape	  before	  entering	  the	  military,	  twice	  the	  
percentage	  of	  an	  equivalent	  civilian	  population.17	  Women	  who	  have	  been	  
raped	   in	   the	   military	   have	   a	   higher	   Post-­‐Traumatic	   Stress	   Disorder	  
                                                
9	  	  See	  Id.	  
10	  Id.	  
11	  Id.	  
12	  Tom	  Vanden	  Brook,	  Congress	  Aims	  to	  Fix	  Military	  Sexual	  Assault	  Crisis,	  USA	  TODAY	  
(Dec.	  10,	  2013),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/10/military-­‐sexual-­‐assault-­‐
congress/3953705/.	  
13	  AZ	  v.	  Shinseki,	  731	  F.3d	  1303,	  1312-­‐14	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)	  (citing	  2012	  SAPRO	  Report,	  
supra	  note	  1,	  at	  53).	  
14	  Jonathon	  Weisman	  &	  Jennifer	  Steinhauer,	  Negotiators	  Reach	  Compromise	  on	  
Defense	  Bill,	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  (December	  9,	  2013),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/us/politics/house-­‐and-­‐senate-­‐reach-­‐
compromise-­‐on-­‐pentagon-­‐bill.html?_r=0.	  
15	  Lauren	  Fox,	  Gillibrand	  Versus	  McCaskill	  and	  Levin:	  The	  War	  to	  Solve	  Military	  
Sexual	  Assaults	  Heats	  Up.	  Lawmakers	  Feud	  Publicly	  on	  How	  to	  Stop	  Rape	  in	  the	  
Military.	  U.S.NEWS	  &	  WORLD	  REPORT	  (July	  29,	  2013),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/29/gillibrand-­‐versus-­‐mccaskill-­‐
and-­‐levin-­‐the-­‐war-­‐to-­‐solve-­‐military-­‐sexual-­‐assaults-­‐heats-­‐up.	  
16	  THE	  INVISIBLE	  WAR	  (Amy	  Ziering	  &	  Tanner	  King	  Barklow	  2012).	  
17	  Nancy	  Ramsey,	  ‘Invisible	  War’:	  New	  Documentary	  Exposes	  Rape	  in	  the	  Military,	  
ABC	  NEWS	  (June	  27,	  2012),	  available	  at	  	  http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rape-­‐military-­‐
invisible-­‐war-­‐documentary-­‐exposes-­‐assaults/story?id=16632490&page=1.	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(“PTSD”)	  rate	  than	  men	  in	  combat.18	  In	  2010,	  there	  were	  2,	  617	  military	  
sexual	  assault	  victims	  (women	  and	  men),	  but	  that	  represented	  only	  about	  
14%	   of	   the	   estimated	   number	   of	   victims;	   86%	   did	   not	   report	   they	   had	  
been	   sexually	   assaulted.19	   40%	  of	   homeless	   female	   veterans	  have	  been	  
raped.20	  In	  2012,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (“DoD”)	  estimated	  that	  only	  
about	  11%	  of	  the	  sexual	  assaults	  involving	  service	  members	  that	  occurred	  
each	  year	  are	  reported	  to	  authority21,	  and	  that	  between	  2006	  and	  2012,	  
fewer	  than	  15%	  of	  military	  sexual	  assault	  victims	  reported	  the	  assault	  to	  a	  
military	   authority22.	   Common	   reasons	   victims	   cite	   for	   not	   reporting	  
include:	  (1)	  the	  belief	  that	  nothing	  would	  be	  done;	  (2)	  fear	  of	  ostracism,	  
harassment,	  or	  ridicule	  by	  peers;	  and	  (3)	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  peers	  would	  
gossip	  about	  the	  incident.23	  These	  statistics24	  make	  clear	  that	  the	  current	  
situation	  is	  unacceptable	  and	  must	  change.	  	  
With	   these	   facts	   in	  mind,	  my	  article	  will	   argue	   that	   the	  military	  
justice	   system	   is	   in	  need	  of	   reform	   that	  will	   actually	  make	  a	  difference.	  
My	  article	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  National	  Authorization	  Act	  of	  2014	  (“NDAA	  
2014”)25	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  to	  ensure	  that	  victims	  of	  sexual	  assault	  
in	   the	  military	  are	  afforded	   justice	  during	  a	  critical	  point	   in	   the	  criminal	  
adjudicative	   process.	  My	   article	   will	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   large	   lack	   of	  
accountability	  because	  victims	  do	  not	  receive	  fair	  and	  meaningful	  justice.	  




21	  See	  AZ	  v.	  Shinseki,	  731	  F.3d	  1303,	  1312-­‐14	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)	  (citing	  1	  DoD	  Sexual	  
Assault	  Prevention	  &	  Response	  Office	  (“SAPRO”),	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Annual	  
Report	  on	  Sexual	  Assault	  in	  the	  Military:	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012,	  at	  18	  (2013)	  (“2012	  SAPRO	  
Report	  ”)).	  	  
22	  Id.	  (citing	  2012	  SAPRO	  Report,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  53).	  
23	  Id.	  (citing	  Gov't	  Accountability	  Office,	  GAO–08–1013T,	  Military	  Personnel:	  
Preliminary	  Observations	  on	  DoD's	  and	  the	  Coast	  Guard's	  Sexual	  Assault	  Prevention	  
and	  Response	  Programs	  14	  (2008))	  
24	  How	  are	  these	  statistics	  gathered?	  Data	  about	  Unrestricted	  Reports	  of	  sexual	  
assault	  reports	  is	  drawn	  from	  official	  investigations	  conducted	  by	  the	  Military	  
Criminal	  Investigation	  Organizations.	  Sexual	  Response	  Coordinators	  collect	  data	  
about	  Restricted	  Reports	  of	  sexual	  assault	  and	  forward	  it	  to	  the	  Military	  Service	  
Sexual	  Assault	  Prevention	  and	  Response	  program	  offices.	  	  Each	  Fiscal	  Year,	  the	  
Under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  Personnel	  and	  Readiness	  submits	  a	  data	  call	  to	  the	  
Military	  Departments	  to	  collect	  the	  required	  statistical	  and	  case	  synopsis	  data.	  DoD	  
SAPRO	  aggregates	  and	  analyzes	  this	  data.	  	  See	  2012	  SAPRO	  Report,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  56.	  
25	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  127	  
Stat	  672.	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Specifically,	   my	   article	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   mandated	   procedural	  
requirements	  of	  Military	  Rule	  of	  Evidence	   (“MRE”)	  41226	  have	  not	  been	  
enforced	   thus	   leading	   to	   the	   harassment	   of	   victims	   during	   pretrial	  
proceeding,	  a	  prevalent	  occurrence.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  injustices	  could	  be	  
cured	   if	   officials	   simply	   abide	   by	   MRE	   412’s	   explicit	   procedural	  
requirements.	   Additionally,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   a	   legally	   trained	   judicial	  
officer	   must	   oversee	   pretrial	   proceedings	   in	   every	   situation	   involving	  
cross-­‐examination.	  	  
My	  article	  will	  illustrate	  the	  defectiveness	  of	  the	  current	  military	  
justice	   system,	   as	   evidenced	  by	   the	  military	   justice	   system’s	   inability	   to	  
provide	  victims	  with	  relief,	  which	  is	  causing	  victims	  to	  bring	  their	  cases	  to	  
civilian	  courts.	  Specifically,	   I	  will	  discuss	  Cioca	  v.	  Rumsfeld,	  a	  U.S.	  Fourth	  
Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  decision	   that	   twenty-­‐eight	  victims,	  discussed	   in	  
the	  documentary	  The	  Invisible	  War,	  brought	  in	  federal	  district	  court.	  My	  
article	  will	  address	  Senator	  Gillibrand’s	  Military	  Justice	  Improvement	  Act	  
(“MJIA”)27.	  Finally,	  my	  article	  will	  analyze	  the	  benefits	  and	  shortcomings	  
of	  other	  sexual	  assault	  related	  reforms	  in	  NDAA	  201428.	  	  
	  
II.	  	  MILITARY	  PROCEDURE	  PRIOR	  TO	  2014,	  THE	  SEVERITY	  OF	  THE	  SEXUAL	  ASSAULT	  
CRISIS,	  AND	  THE	  NEED	  FOR	  ARTICLE	  32	  HEARING	  REFORM	  
	  
A. The	  Military	  Justice	  System	  Prior	  to	  the	  Passage	  of	  the	  National	  
Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  of	  201429	  
	  
To	   understand	   why	   reform	   is	   so	   important,	   one	   must	  
understand	   the	   fundamental	   differences	   between	   the	   military	   and	  
civilian	  legal	  systems.	  While	  my	  article	  does	  go	  on	  at	  some	  length	  to	  
lie	   out	   the	   relevant	   military	   legal	   procedures,	   I	   believe	   such	   an	  
overview	   is	   necessary	   to	   fully	   grasp	   why	   it	   has	   the	   potential	   for	  
implementing	   subpar	   justice.	   “The	   Constitution,	   in	   order	   to	   provide	  
for	   the	   common	   defense30,	   gives	   Congress	   the	   power	   to	   raise,	  
support,	   and	   regulate	   the	  Armed	   Forces31,	   but	  makes	   the	   President	  
                                                
26	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412.	  	  
27	  Military	  Justice	  Improvement	  Act,	  S.	  967,	  113TH	  Cong.	  (2013).	  
28	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  127	  
Stat	  672.	  
29	  Id.	  
30	  See	  Mason,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  1	  (citing	  U.S.	  CONST.	  Preamble).	  
31	  See	  Id.	  at	  1	  (citing	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I	  §8,	  cls.	  11-­‐14	  (War	  Power)).	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Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Armed	   Forces.32”	   “Article	   III,	   which	  
governs	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  does	  not	  give	  that	  judiciary	  any	  explicit	  
role	   in	   the	  military,	  and	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	   taken	   the	  view	  that	  
Congress’s	   power	   ‘[t]o	   make	   Rules	   for	   the	   Government	   and	  
Regulation	   of	   the	   land	   and	   naval	   Forces’33	   is	   entirely	   separate	   from	  
Article	   III.”34	   Therefore,	   courts-­‐martial	   are	   not	   considered	   to	   be	  
Article	   III	   courts	  and	  are	  not	   subject	   to	  all	  of	   the	   rules	   that	  apply	   in	  
federal	  courts.35	  	  
“Discipline	   is	   as	   important	   as	   liberty	   interests	   in	   the	  military	  
justice	   system.”36	   “The	   Constitution	   specifically	   exempts	   military	  
members	   accused	   of	   a	   crime	   from	   the	   Fifth	   Amendment	   right	   to	   a	  
grand	   jury	   indictment,	   from	  which	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   inferred	  
there	   is	  no	  right	   to	  a	  civil	   jury	   in	  courts-­‐martial.”37	   	  Article	  32	  of	   the	  
Uniform	   Code	   of	   Military	   Justice	   (“UCMJ”)	   mandates	   a	   pre-­‐trial	  
hearing	   that	   performs	   the	   same	   function	   as	   a	   grand	   jury,	   finding	  
probable	   cause	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   prosecution.38	   Court-­‐martial	  
panels	   consist	   of	   a	  military	   judge	   and	   several	   panel	  members,	   who	  
function	  similarly	  to	  a	  jury.39	  
Under	   Article	   I,	   Section	   8	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution,	   Congress	  
retains	  the	  powers	  to	  raise	  and	  support	  armies,	  provide	  and	  maintain	  
a	  navy,	  and	  provide	   for	  organizing	  and	  disciplining	   them.40	  Pursuant	  
to	   this	   power,	   Congress	   enacted	   the	   UCMJ,41	   which	   is	   the	   code	   of	  
military	  criminal	   laws	  applicable	  to	  all	  U.S.	  military	  members	  around	  
the	   globe.42	   The	   President	   implemented	   the	   UCMJ	   through	   the	  
Manual	  for	  Courts-­‐Martial	  (“MCM”),	  which	  was	  initially	  promulgated	  
by	   Executive	   Order	   12473	   (April	   13,	   1984).43	   Military	   courts	   are	  
considered	  Article	  I	  courts,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  are	  of	  limited	  jurisdiction.44	  
                                                
32	  See	  Id.	  at	  1	  (citing	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  II	  §2,	  cl.	  1).	  	  
33	  See	  Id.	  at	  1	  (citing	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I	  §8,	  cl.	  14).	  
34	  See	  Id.	  at	  2	  (citing	  Dynes	  v.	  Hoover,	  61	  U.S.	  (How.)	  65	  (1857)).	  	  
35	  See	  Id.	  at	  2	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	  
36	  See	  Id.	  at	  2.	  
37	  See	  Id.	  at	  2.	  
38	  Id.	  at	  2	  ,	  note	  9	  (citing	  Ex	  Parte	  Milligan,	  71	  U.S.	  (4	  Wall.)	  2	  (1866)).	  
39	  See	  Id.	  
40	  See	  Id.	  at	  2.	  
41	  See	  Id.	  at	  2	  (citing	  10	  U.S.C.	  §§801-­‐941).	  	  
42	  See	  Id.	  at	  2.	  
43	  See	  Id.	  
44	  See	  Id.	  at	  2,	  n.	  15	  (citing	  United	  States	  v.	  Wuterich,	  67	  M.J.	  32	  (2007)).	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Article	   I	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution,	   addressing	   legislative	   powers	   of	  
Congress,	   includes	   the	  power	   to	   regulate	   the	  Armed	  Forces,	   and	  by	  
implication,	   the	   power	   to	   create	   legislative	   courts	   to	   enforce	   those	  
regulations.45	  In	  creating	  legislative	  courts,	  Congress	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  
the	  restrictions	  imposed	  in	  Article	  III.46	  
The	   UCMJ	   gives	   court-­‐martial	   jurisdiction	   over	   service	  
members47	   and	   other	   categories	   of	   individuals,	   including	   retired	  
members	   of	   a	   regular	   component	   of	   the	   Armed	   Service	   entitled	   to	  
pay;	  retired	  members	  of	  a	  reserve	  component	  who	  are	  hospitalized	  in	  
a	   military	   hospital;	   persons	   in	   custody	   of	   the	   military	   serving	   a	  
sentence	   imposed	   by	   a	   court-­‐martial;	   members	   of	   the	   National	  
Oceanic	   and	   Atmospheric	   Administration	   and	   Public	   Health	   Service	  
and	   other	   organizations,	   when	   assigned	   to	   serve	   with	   the	   military;	  
enemy	  prisoners	  of	  war	   in	  custody	  of	   the	  military;	  and	  persons	  with	  
or	  accompanying	  the	  military	  in	  the	  field	  during	  ‘times	  of	  war,’	  limited	  
to	   declared	  wars.48	   The	  MCM	   contains	   the	   Rules	   for	   Courts-­‐Martial	  
(“RCM”),	   the	   MRE,49	   and	   the	   UCMJ.50	   The	   MCM	   covers	   nearly	   all	  
aspects	   of	   military	   law.51	   Jurisdiction	   of	   a	   court-­‐martial	   does	   not	  
depend	   on	   where	   the	   offense	   happened;	   it	   depends	   exclusively	   on	  
the	   status	   of	   the	   accused.52Courts-­‐martial	   try	   “military	   offenses,”	  
which	   are	   listed	   in	   the	   punitive	   articles	   of	   the	   UCMJ	   and	   are	   also	  
codified	   in	   10	   U.S.C.	   877	   et	   seq.53	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   does	   not	  
promulgate	  procedural	   rules	   for	   courts-­‐martial.54	  Congress	   regulates	  
the	   Armed	   Forces	   primarily	   through	   Title	   10	   of	   the	   United	   States	  
Code.55	   Congress	   established	   three	   types	   of	   courts-­‐martial:	   (1)	  
summary	   court-­‐martial,	   (2)	   specific	   court-­‐martial,	   and	   (3)	   general	  
                                                
45	  See	  Id.	  
46	  See	  Id.	  at	  3,	  n.	  16	  (“The	  term	  service	  members,	  as	  used	  in	  this	  report,	  includes	  
uniformed	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Army,	  U.S.	  Marine	  Corps,	  U.S.	  Navy,	  U.S.	  Air	  Force,	  
and	  the	  U.S.	  Coast	  Guard.”)	  	  
47	  See	  Id.	  at	  3.	  	  
48	  See	  Id.	  at	  3	  (citing	  Art.	  2,	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  802).	  
49	  See	  Id.	  at	  3,	  n.	  13	  (“Rules	  of	  procedure	  and	  rules	  of	  evidence	  for	  courts-­‐martial	  are	  
established	  by	  the	  President	  and	  authorized	  by	  Art.	  36,	  UCMJ	  (10	  U.S.C.	  	  §	  836)”).	  	  
50	  See	  Id.	  at	  3.	  
51	  See	  Id.	  	  
52	  See	  Id.	  at	  3	  (citing	  Solorio	  v.	  United	  States,	  483	  U.S.	  435,	  447	  (1987)).	  	  
53	  See	  Id.	  at	  3,	  n.	  19.	  	  
54	  See	  Id.	  at	  5.	  
55	  See	  Id.	  at	  5.	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court-­‐martial.56	  	  
When	  a	   service	  member	  has	  allegedly	  committed	  an	  offense,	  
the	  accused’s	   immediate	  commander	  will	   conduct	  an	   inquiry.57	   Such	  
inquiry	   may	   range	   from	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   charges	   and	   an	  
investigative	   report	   or	   summary	   of	   expected	   evidence	   to	   a	   more	  
thorough	   investigation,	   depending	  on	   the	  offense(s)	   alleged	   and	   the	  
complexity	   of	   the	   case.58	   The	   investigation	   may	   be	   conducted	   by	  
members	   of	   the	   command	   or,	   in	   more	   complex	   cases,	   military	   and	  
civilian	  law	  enforcement	  officials.59	  Once	  evidence	  has	  been	  collected	  
and	  a	  complete	  inquiry	  has	  been	  made,	  the	  commander	  can	  chose	  to	  
dispose	   of	   the	   charges	   by	   either	   (1)	   taking	   no	   action,	   (2)	   initiating	  
administrative	   action,	   which	   can	   include	   separation	   from	   the	  
military,60	   (3)	   imposing	   non-­‐judicial	   punishment,	   (4)	   preferring	  
charges,	   or	   (5)	   forwarding	   to	   a	   higher	   authority	   for	   preferral	   of	  
charges.61	  	  
	   The	   first	   formal	   step	   in	   a	   court-­‐martial,	   preferral	  of	   charges,	   is	  
comprised	   of	   the	   drafting	   of	   a	   charge	   sheet	   containing	   the	   charges	  
and	   specifications,	   which	   is	   a	   plain	   and	   concise	   statement	   of	   the	  
essential	  facts	  constituting	  the	  offense	  charged	  against	  the	  accused.62	  
The	   charging	   document	   must	   be	   signed	   by	   the	   accuser	   under	   oath	  
before	   a	   commissioned	   officer	   authorized	   to	   administer	   oaths.63	   A	  
charge	  amounts	  to	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  Article	  of	  the	  Code	  or	  other	  law	  
allegedly	   violated.64	   A	   specification	   is	   a	   concise	   statement	   of	   the	  
essential	   facts	   constituting	   the	   offense	   charged.65	   Once	   the	   charges	  
have	  been	  preferred,	  they	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  one	  of	  the	  three	  types	  
of	  courts-­‐martial.66	  	  
	   Before	   convening	   a	   general	   court-­‐martial,	   a	   pretrial	   Article	   32	  
investigation	  hearing	  must	  be	  conducted;	  this	  is	  meant	  to	  ensure	  that	  
                                                
56	  See	  Id.	  at	  4	  (citing	  Art.	  16	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  816).	  	  
57	  See	  Id.	  at	  3	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  303).	  
58	  See	  Id.	  at	  3.	  
59	  See	  Id.	  
60	  See	  Id.	  at	  4,	  n.	  24	  (citing	  10	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1161	  et	  seq).	  	  
61	  See	  Id.	  at	  4	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  306(c)).	  	  
62	  See	  Id.	  at	  4	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  307(c)(3)).	  
63	  See	  Id.	  at	  4	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  307(b)).	  	  
64	  United	  States	  v.	  Franklin,	  68	  M.J.	  603,	  604	  (A.	  Ct.	  Crim.	  App.	  2010)	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  
307(c)(2)).	   
65	  Id.	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  307(c)(3)).	  	  
66	  See	  Mason,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  4	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  401(c)).	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there	  is	  a	  basis	  for	  prosecution.67	  An	  investigating	  officer	  (“IO”),	  who	  
must	  be	  a	  commissioned	  officer,	  presides	  and	  should	  be	  an	  officer	   in	  
the	   grade	   of	   major	   or	   lieutenant	   commander	   or	   higher	   or	   one	   with	  
legal	  training.68	  Unlike	  a	  civilian	  grand	  jury	  proceeding,	  at	  an	  Article	  32	  
hearing	   the	   accused	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   examine	   the	   evidence	  
presented	   against	   him	  or	   her,	   cross-­‐examine	  witnesses,	   and	  present	  
his	   or	   her	   own	   arguments.69	   In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   investigation	  
uncovers	   evidence	   that	   the	   accused	   has	   committed	   an	   offense	   not	  
charged,	  the	  investigating	  officer	  can	  recommend	  that	  new	  charges	  be	  
added.70	   Additionally,	   if	   the	   investigating	   officer	   believes	   that	  
evidence	   is	   insufficient	   to	   support	   a	   charge,	   the	   investigating	   officer	  
can	   recommend	   dismissal	   of	   the	   charge.71	   When	   the	   Article	   32	  
investigation	   is	   complete,	   the	   investigation	   officer	   makes	  
recommendations	  to	  the	  convening	  authority	  (“CA”)	  through	  the	  CA’s	  
legal	  advisor.72	  The	   legal	  advisor	   then	  provides	   the	  CA	  with	  a	   formal	  
written	  recommendation,	  called	  the	  Article	  34	  UCMJ	  advice,	  as	  to	  the	  
disposition	   of	   the	   charges,	   and	   then	   the	   CA	   determines	   whether	   to	  
convene	  a	  court-­‐martial	  or	  to	  dismiss	  the	  charge(s).73	  	  
	   Before	  any	  charge	  may	  be	  referred	  for	  trial	  by	  a	  general	  court-­‐
martial,	  it	  shall	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  Staff	  Judge	  Advocate	  (“SJA”)	  of	  the	  
CA	  for	  consideration	  and	  advice.74	  The	  advice	  of	  the	  SJA	  shall	  include	  a	  
written	   and	   signed	   statement	   which	   sets	   forth	   that	   person’s:	   1)	  
conclusion	   with	   respect	   to	   whether	   each	   specification	   alleges	   an	  
offense	   under	   the	   code;	   2)	   conclusions	  with	   respect	   to	  whether	   the	  
allegation	  of	   each	  offense	   is	  warranted	  by	   the	  evidence	   indicated	   in	  
the	   repot	   of	   investigation;	   3)	   conclusions	  with	   respect	   to	  whether	   a	  
court-­‐martial	   would	   have	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   accused	   and	   the	  
offense;	  and	  4)	  recommendation	  of	  the	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  CA.75	  
Referral	   is	   the	  order	  of	   a	  CA	   that	   charges	  against	   an	  accused	  
                                                
67	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  32	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C	  §	  832).	  	  
68	  See	  Id.	  at	  7,	  n.	  61	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  405(d)(1))	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
69	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  32(b)-­‐(c),	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C	  §	  832(b)-­‐(c);	  R.C.M.	  405(f);	  United	  
States	  v.	  Davis,	  64	  M.J.	  445	  (2007)).	  
70	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  32(d),	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  823(d);	  R.C.M.	  407).	  	  
71	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  32(d),	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  823(d);	  R.C.M.	  407).	  
72	  See	  Id.	  at	  7.	  
73	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  33-­‐35,	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  833-­‐835;	  R.C.M.	  407)	  (emphasis	  
added).	  
74	  R.C.M.	  406(a).	  	  
75	  R.C.M.	  406(b).	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will	   be	   tried	   by	   a	   specified	   court-­‐martial.76	   The	   CA	  may	   not	   refer	   a	  
specification	  under	  a	  charge	  to	  a	  general	  court	  martial	  unless:	  1)	  there	  
has	   been	   substantial	   compliance	   with	   the	   pretrial	   investigating	  
requirements	  under	  RCM	  405;	  and	  2)	  The	  CA	  has	  received	  the	  advice	  
of	   the	   staff	   advocate	   required	   under	   RCM	   406.77	   However,	   both	   of	  
these	  prerequisites	  may	  be	  waived	  by	  the	  accused.78	  The	  CA	  or	  judge	  
advocate	  shall	  not	  be	  required	  before	  charges	  are	  referred	  to	  resolve	  
legal	  issues,	  including	  objections	  to	  evidence	  that	  may	  arise	  at	  trial.79	  
	   A	  court-­‐martial	  is	  created	  by	  a	  convening	  order	  of	  the	  CA.80	  The	  
court-­‐martial	   must	   be	   convened	   by	   an	   officer	   with	   sufficient	   legal	  
authority,	  meaning	  the	  CA,	  who	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  the	  commander	  of	  
the	  unit	  to	  which	  the	  accused	  is	  assigned.81	  A	  general	  court-­‐martial	  is	  
the	  highest	  trial	   level	   in	  military	   law	  and	  is	  usually	  used	  for	  the	  most	  
serious	   offenses.82	   A	   general	   court-­‐martial	   panel	   is	   composed	   of	   a	  
military	   judge	   sitting	   alone,	   or	   in	   the	   alternative,	   not	   less	   than	   five	  
members	  and	  a	  military	  judge.83	  The	  accused	  has	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  
the	   composition	   of	   the	   court-­‐martial	   except	   in	   capital	   cases,	   where	  
jury	  members	  are	  required.	  84	  	  
Convictions	  at	  a	  general	   court-­‐martial	   that	   include	  a	  punitive	  
discharge	   are	   subject	   to	   an	   automatic	   post-­‐trial	   review	  by	   the	  CA.85	  
This	  process	  begins	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  trial	  record	  by	  the	  SJA,	  who	  
makes	   a	   recommendation	   to	   the	  CA	   as	   to	  what	   course	   to	   pursue.86	  
“The	   review	   is	   ‘probably	   the	  accused’s	  best	   chance	   for	   relief,	  as	   the	  
CA	  has	  broad	  powers	  to	  act	  on	  the	  case.’”87	  After	  the	  CA	  has	  reviewed	  
the	  trial	  record	  and	  the	  SJA’s	  recommendation(s),	  the	  CA	  may,	  among	  
                                                
76	  R.C.M.	  601(a).	  	  
77	  R.C.M.	  601(d).	  	  
78	  Id.	  	  
79	  Id.	  	  
80	  R.C.M.	  504(a);	  See	  also	  R.C.M.	  103	  (“‘Convening	  authority’	  includes	  a	  
commissioned	  officer	  in	  command	  for	  the	  time	  being	  and	  successors	  in	  command.”).	  
81	  See	  Id.,	  at	  4	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  103(6)).	  	  
82	  See	  Id.	  at	  7.	  
83	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  16,	  UCMJ;	  R.C.M.	  201(f)(1)(C));	  Members	  in	  the	  military	  
justice	  system	  are	  the	  equivalent	  of	  jurors	  and	  are	  generally	  composed	  of	  officers	  
from	  the	  accused’s	  command.	  See	  Id.	  at	  6	  n.	  53.	  
84	  See	  Id.	  at	  7	  (citing	  Art.	  16,	  UCMJ;	  R.C.M.	  903).	  
85	  See	  Id.	  at	  8.	  
86	  See	  Id.	  at	  8	  (citing	  Art.	  32(d),	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  823(d);	  R.C.M.	  407).	  
87	  See	  Id.	  at	  8	  (citing	  United	  States	  v	  Davis,	  58	  M.J.	  100,	  102	  (2003)).	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other	   remedies,	   suspend	   all	   or	   part	   of	   the	   sentence,	   disapprove	   a	  
finding	   or	   a	   conviction,	   or	   commute	   the	   sentence,	   but	   cannot	  
increase	   the	   sentence.88	   Once	   the	   CA	   takes	   action	   on	   the	   case,	   the	  
conviction	  is	  ripe	  for	  an	  appeal.89	  
	  
B. The	   Story	   That	   Sparked	   Public	   Outrage:	   Maryland	   Naval	  
Academy,	  Fall	  2013.	  	  
	  
Reforms	   to	   Article	   32	   hearings	   were	   included	   in	   the	   NDAA	  
2014,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   because	   of	   the	   public	   outrage	   that	   followed	  
from	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  that	  took	  place	  in	  August	  and	  September	  
of	   2013	   at	   the	   United	   States	   Naval	   Academy.90	   For	   roughly	   thirty	  
hours	   over	   several	   days,	   defense	   lawyers	   for	   three	   former	   Naval	  
Academy	   football	   players	   grilled	   a	   female	   midshipman	   about	   her	  
sexual	   habits.91	   In	   a	   public	   hearing,	   they	   asked	   the	   woman,	   who	  
accused	   the	   three	   athletes	   of	   raping	   her,	   whether	   she	   wore	   a	   bra,	  
how	  wide	   she	   opened	   her	  mouth	   during	   oral	   sex,	   and	  whether	   she	  
had	   apologized	   to	   another	   midshipman	   with	   whom	   she	   had	  
intercourse	  “for	  being	  a	  ho.”92	  	  
This	  Naval	  Academy	  case	  stems	  from	  a	  2012	  “yoga	  and	  toga”	  
off-­‐campus	   party	   near	   the	   academy	   in	   Annapolis,	  Maryland,	  where,	  
according	   to	   the	   alleged	   victim’s	   testimony,	   she	   arrived	   intoxicated	  
and	   continued	   to	   drink.93	   In	   testimony	   at	   the	   hearing,	   she	   said	   she	  
had	  no	  memory	  of	  parts	  of	   the	  evening	  and	  may	  have	  passed	  out.94	  
The	  next	  day,	  the	  woman	  testified	  that	  she	  heard	  from	  a	  friend	  of	  one	  
of	   the	   three	   football	   players	   via	   social	  media	   that	   she	   had	   sex	  with	  
them	   at	   an	   Annapolis	   home	   known	   as	   “the	   football	   house.”95	   The	  
three	   football	   players	   were	   charged	   with	   sexually	   assaulting	   and	  
making	  false	  statements.96	  
Commander	   Robert	   J.	  Monahan	   Jr.,	   a	   Navy	   Judge	   Advocate	  
                                                
88	  See	  Id.	  at	  8	  (citing	  Art.	  60,	  UCMJ;	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  860;	  R.C.M.	  1107).	  	  
89	  See	  Id.	  at	  8.	  
90	  Steinhauer	  1,	  supra	  note	  4.	  
91	  Id.	  	  
92	  Id.	  	  




2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Where	  is	  The	  Justice?	  	  	   308	  308	  
General	  (“JAG”),	  served	  as	  the	  Article	  32	  IO	  at	  the	  pretrial	  hearing.97	  
After	   four	  days	  and	  more	   than	   twenty	  hours	  of	   relentless	  questions	  
about	  the	  alleged	  victim’s	  medical	  history,	  motivations,	  dance	  moves,	  
and	   underwear,	   the	   twenty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  midshipman	   pleaded	   for	   a	  
day	   off	   from	   testimony.98	   The	   investigating	   officer	   granted	   the	  
victim’s	   request,	   but	   not	   before	   the	   request	   triggered	   more	  
skepticism	  from	  defense	  attorneys,	  who	  said	   the	  young	  woman	  was	  
faking	   her	   exhaustion.99	   The	   IO	   made	   his	   decision	   after	   a	   pointed	  
request	   by	   Susan	  Burke,	   the	  woman’s	   attorney,	  who	   said	   her	   client	  
was	  being	  worn	  down	  by	  limitless	  and	  repetitive	  questioning	  by	  three	  
separate	  legal	  teams	  representing	  the	  defendants.100	  By	  the	  time	  the	  
alleged	  victim	  concluded,	   she	  had	  been	  on	   the	   stand	   for	  more	   than	  
twenty-­‐four	   hours	   over	   five	   days.101	   When	   asked	   why	   she	   did	   not	  
come	  forward	  sooner,	  the	  alleged	  victim	  said	  that	  she	  “didn’t	  want	  to	  
make	  it	  a	  big	  deal”	  and	  began	  tearing	  up	  as	  she	  said	  she	  “didn’t	  want	  
to	   disappoint	   her	  mother.”102	   She	   added,	   “I	   guess	   I	   just	   didn’t	   have	  
the	  courage.”103	  
During	   cross-­‐examination,	   defense	   lawyers	   repeatedly	   asked	  
the	  victim	  about	  a	  consensual	  sexual	  encounter	  she	  said	  she	  had	  the	  
                                                
97	  Annys	  Shin,	  Three	  Former	  Naval	  Academy	  Football	  Players	  Face	  Accuser	  at	  




98	  Melinda	  Henneberger	  &	  Annys	  Shin,	  Military’s	  Handling	  of	  Sex	  Assault	  Cases	  on	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  Lyndsey	  Layton,	  Accuser	  in	  Naval	  Academy	  Rape	  Case	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  Testimony	  After	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  Id.	  	  
102	  Ali	  Weinberg,	  Woman	  at	  Center	  of	  Alleged	  Naval	  Academy	  Gang	  Rape	  Testifies	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day	  after	  the	  alleged	  rape.104	  One	  of	  the	  defendants’	  attorneys,	  asked	  
the	  victim	  whether	  she	  wore	  a	  bra	  or	  other	  underwear	   to	   the	  party	  
and	  whether	  she	  “felt	  like	  a	  ho”	  afterward.105	  An	  attorney	  for	  one	  of	  
the	  other	  defendants	  asked	  the	  victim	  repeatedly	  about	  her	  oral	  sex	  
technique,	  arguing	  over	  objections	  from	  the	  prosecution	  that	  oral	  sex	  
would	  indicate	  the	  “active	  participation”	  of	  the	  woman	  and	  therefore	  
her	   consent.106	   Even	   when	   the	   IO	   did	   sustain	   the	   prosecutors’	  
objections,	   barring,	   for	   example,	   a	   question	   about	   whether	   the	  
alleged	   victim	   carried	   condoms	   in	   her	   purse,	   the	   tone	   of	   the	   cross-­‐
examination	  did	  not	   change.107	   “This	  was	   a	   case	  of	   defense	   lawyers	  
gone	  wild,	   unhampered	   by	   strict	   rules	   of	   evidence	   and	  with	   clearly	  
inadequate	   supervision	   by	   the	   officer	   who	   presided	   over	   the	  
melee.”108	  
In	   an	   interview,	   the	   victim’s	   attorney	   told	   the	   New	   York	  
Times,	  “I	  have	  been	  contacted	  by	  many,	  many	  victims	  told	  they	  had	  
to	   go	   through	   this	   abusive	   process.	  One	   of	   the	   complexities	   is	   they	  
are	   forced	   to	   go	   through	   this,	   but	   the	   decision	  maker	   is	   not	   in	   the	  
room.”109	   Article	   32	   proceedings	   permit	   “questions	   not	   allowed	   in	  
civilian	   courts	   and	   can	   include	   cross-­‐examination	   of	   witnesses	   so	  
intense	  that	  legal	  experts	  say	  they	  frighten	  many	  victims	  from	  coming	  
forward.”110	   The	   New	   York	   Times	   reported	   in	   the	   same	   article	   that	  
“[s]everal	  military	   justice	   experts	   said	  Article	   32	  proceedings	   should	  
be	  eliminated.”	  
Legal	  scholar,	  Victor	  M.	  Hansen,	  a	  former	  military	  lawyer,	  told	  
the	  New	  York	  Times	  that	  military	  rape	  proceedings	  should	  be	  changed	  
to	  look	  more	  like	  proceedings	  for	  civilian	  rape	  trials,	  where	  questions	  
about	  a	  woman’s	  sexual	  techniques	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  and	  where	  
rape	   shield	   laws	   would	   either	   prohibit	   or	   limit	   questions	   about	   a	  
woman’s	  sexual	  history.111	  	  
                                                
104	  Steinhauer	  2,	  supra	  note	  4.	  
105	  Id.	  
106	  Id.	  
107	  Henneberger	  &	  Shin,	  supra	  note	  98.	  
108	  Ruth	  Marcus,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  In	  Navy	  Rape	  Case,	  Defense	  Lawyers	  Go	  Wild,	  WASH.	  POST,	  
(Sep.	  5,	  2013),	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-­‐marcus-­‐in-­‐navy-­‐
rape-­‐case-­‐defense-­‐lawyers-­‐go-­‐wild/2013/09/05/2c729520-­‐1647-­‐11e3-­‐a2ec-­‐
b47e45e6f8ef_story.html.	  
109	  Steinhauer	  2,	  supra	  note	  4.	  
110	  Id.	  (emphasis	  added).	  
111	  Id.	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C. NDAA	  2014	  Reforms	  
	  
Title	   XVII	   of	   The	   NDAA	   2014,	   includes	   a	   series	   of	   “Sexual	  
Assault	   Prevention	   and	   Response	   Related	   Reforms.”112	   I	  will	   discuss	  
only	   those	   relevant	   to	  my	   argument.	   Section	   1701	   provides	   specific	  
rights	  for	  victims	  of	  offenses	  under	  the	  UCMJ	  including	  the	  rights	  to:	  
(1)	   be	   protected	   from	   the	   accused;	   (2)	   reasonable,	   accurate,	   and	  
timely	  notice	  of	  any	  public	  proceeding	   involving	   the	  offense;	   (3)	  not	  
be	  excluded	  from	  such	  proceeding113;	  (4)	  confer	  with	  trial	  counsel	   in	  
the	   case;	   (5)	   full	   and	   timely	   restitution;	   (6)	   proceedings	   free	   from	  
unreasonable	  delay;	  and	  (7)	  be	  treated	  with	  fairness	  and	  respect	  for	  
the	  victim’s	  dignity	  and	  privacy.114	  Section	  1701	  also	  provides	  for	  the	  
assumption	  of	  such	  rights	  by	  a	   legal	  guardian	   in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  victim	  
who	   is	   under	   eighteen	   years	   of	   age,	   incompetent,	   incapacitated,	   or	  
deceased.115	  Section	  1701	  is	  required	  to	  be	  implemented	  “[n]ot	  later	  
than	  one	  year	  after	  the	  date	  of	  the	  enactment	  of	  [the]	  Act.”116	  	  
Section	  1702	  amends	  Article	  32	  proceedings,	  and	  is	  codified	  in	  
10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832.117	  The	  amendment	  changes	  the	  name	  of	  the	  hearing	  
from	  an	  “investigation	  under	   section	  832”	   to	   “a	  preliminary	  hearing	  
under	  section	  832.”118	  No	  charge	  or	  specification	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  
general	   court-­‐martial	   for	   trial	   until	   completion	   of	   a	   preliminary	  
hearing.119	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  hearing	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  determination	  of	  
probable	   cause,	   appropriate	   jurisdiction,	   the	   form	  of	   charges,	   and	  a	  
recommendation	  of	  case	  disposition.120	  	  
Additionally,	   section	   1702	   amends	   the	   IO	   qualification	  
                                                
112	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  127	  
Stat	  672.	  
113	  Unless	  the	  military	  judge	  or	  IO,	  as	  applicable,	  after	  receiving	  clear	  and	  convincing	  
evidence,	  determines	  that	  testimony	  by	  the	  victim	  of	  an	  offense	  under	  this	  chapter	  
would	  be	  materially	  altered	  if	  the	  victim	  heard	  testimony	  at	  that	  hearing	  or	  
proceeding.	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  
113-­‐66,	  §	  1701,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  806b	  (2014)).	  
114	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1701,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  806b	  (2014)).	  
115	  Id.	  	  
116	  Id.	  	  
117	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1702,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832	  (2014)).	  
118	  Id.	  	  
119	  Id.	  	  
120	  Id.	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requirements.121	  Under	   the	   amendment,	   a	   preliminary	   hearing	   shall	  
be	   conducted	   by	   an	   impartial	   JAG	   whenever	   practicable	   or,	   in	  
exceptional	   circumstances	   in	  which	   the	   interests	   of	   justice	  warrant,	  
by	   an	   impartial	   hearing	   officer	   who	   is	   not	   a	   JAG.122	   If	   the	   hearing	  
officer	  is	  not	  a	  JAG,	  a	  JAG	  shall	  be	  available	  to	  provide	  legal	  advice	  to	  
the	  hearing	  officer.123	  After	  conducting	  a	  preliminary	  hearing,	  the	  JAG	  
or	   IO	   conducting	   the	   preliminary	   hearing	   shall	   prepare	   a	   report.124	  
Section	  1702	  amends	  §832	  by	  stating:	  “A	  victim	  may	  not	  be	  required	  
to	   testify	   at	   the	   preliminary	   hearing.125	   A	   victim	   who	   declines	   to	  
testify	   shall	   be	   deemed	   to	   be	   not	   available	   for	   purposes	   of	   the	  
preliminary	   hearing.”126	   The	   presentation	   of	   evidence	   and	  
examination	   (including	   cross-­‐examination)	   of	   witnesses	   at	   a	  
preliminary	   hearing	   shall	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   matters	   relevant	   to	   the	  
limited	  purposes	  of	  the	  hearing.127	  Failure	  to	  follow	  the	  requirements	  
of	  this	  section	  does	  not	  constitute	  jurisdictional	  error.128	  	  
Section	  1704	  requires	  defense	  counsel	  to	  make	  any	  request	  to	  
interview	   the	   alleged	   victim	   of	   a	   sex-­‐related	   offense,	   who	   the	   trial	  
counsel	  of	  the	  alleged	  victim	  intends	  to	  call	  to	  testify	  at	  a	  preliminary	  
hearing,	   through	   the	   trial	   counsel.129	   Any	   interview	   under	   Section	  
1704	  must	  be	   conducted	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   trial	   counsel,	   a	   counsel	  
for	  the	  victim,	  or	  a	  Sexual	  Assault	  Victim	  Advocate	  (“SAVA”).130	  	  
Section	   1716	   also	   directs	   the	   Secretary	   concerned	   to	  
designate	  legal	  counsel,	  known	  as	  Special	  Victims’	  Counsel	  (“SVC”)	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  legal	  assistance	  to	  a	  member	  or	  dependent	  
                                                
121	  Id.	  	  
122	  Id.	  	  
123	  Id	  
124	  Id	  
125	  Id.	  	  
126	  Id.	  
127	  Id.	  	  
128	  United	  States	  v.	  Burton,	  ACM	  36296,	  2007	  WL	  2300788,	  at	  *3	  (A.F.	  Ct.	  Crim.	  App.	  
July	  16,	  2007)	  aff'd,	  67	  M.J.	  150	  (C.A.A.F.	  2009)	  (“The	  requirements	  for	  pretrial	  
investigations	  are	  binding	  but	  failure	  to	  follow	  them	  does	  not	  constitute	  
jurisdictional	  error.	  An	  error	  in	  the	  Article	  32,	  UCMJ,	  investigation	  process	  is	  not	  a	  
structural	  error	  subject	  to	  reversal	  without	  testing	  for	  prejudice.”(internal	  citations	  
omitted)).	  
129	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1704,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  846	  (2014)).	  
130	  Id.	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who	  is	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  sex-­‐related	  offense.131	  Section	  1716	  authorizes	  
several	   forms	   of	   legal	   assistance,	   which	   include	   in	   part:	   1)	   legal	  
consultation	   regarding	   potential	   criminal	   liability	   of	   the	   victim	  
stemming	   from	   or	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   circumstances	   surrounding	   the	  
alleged	   sex-­‐related	   offense;	   2)	   legal	   consultation	   regarding	   the	  
military	  justice	  system,	  including	  the	  victim’s	  responsibility	  to	  testify,	  
and	   other	   duties	   to	   the	   court;	   3)	   to	   accompany	   the	   victim	   at	   any	  
proceeding	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   reporting,	   military	   investigation,	  
and	  military	  prosecution	  of	  the	  alleged	  sex-­‐related	  offense132;	  4)	  legal	  
consultation	   regarding	   eligibility	   and	   requirements	   for	   services	  
available	   from	   appropriate	   agencies	   or	   officers	   for	   emotional	   and	  
mental	   health	   counseling	   and	   other	   medical	   services;	   and	   5)	   legal	  
consultation	  and	  assistance	  in	  any	  proceedings	  of	  the	  military	  justice	  
process	   in	   which	   a	   victim	   can	   participate	   as	   a	   witness	   or	   other	  
party.133	   Section	   1716	  makes	   the	   relationship	   between	   an	   SVC	   and	  
victim	   one	   protected	   by	   attorney-­‐client	   privilege.134	   Victims	   of	   an	  
alleged	   sex-­‐related	   offense	   shall	   be	   offered	   the	   option	   of	   receiving	  
assistance	   from	  a	  SVC	  upon	  report	  of	  an	  alleged	  sex-­‐related	  offense	  
or	   at	   the	   time	   the	   victim	   seeks	   assistance	   from	   a	   SAVA,	   a	   military	  
criminal	   investigator,	   a	   victim/witness	   liaison,	   a	   trial	   counsel,	   a	  
healthcare	   provider,	   or	   any	   other	   personnel	   designated	   by	   the	  
Secretary.135	   Section	   1716	   will	   be	   implemented	   180	   days	   from	   the	  
                                                
131	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1716,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  1044e	  (2014)).	  
132	  Although	  a	  non-­‐party	  to	  the	  Courts-­‐Martial,	  an	  alleged	  victim	  of	  sexual	  assault	  
has	  standing.	  See	  LRM	  v.	  Kastenberg,	  72	  M.J.	  364,	  368,	  370,	  372	  (C.A.A.F.	  2013)	  
(“[The]	  [victim’s]	  position	  as	  a	  nonparty	  to	  the	  courts-­‐martial	  does	  not	  preclude	  
standing.	  There	  is	  long-­‐standing	  precedent	  that	  a	  holder	  of	  a	  privilege	  has	  a	  right	  to	  
contest	  and	  protect	  the	  privilege.	  .	  .	  .	  Statutory	  construction	  indicates	  that	  the	  
President	  intended,	  or	  at	  a	  minimum	  did	  not	  preclude,	  that	  the	  right	  to	  be	  heard	  in	  
evidentiary	  hearings	  under	  M.R.E.	  412	  and	  513	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  right	  to	  be	  heard	  
through	  counsel	  on	  legal	  issues,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  witness.	  .	  .	  .	  M.R.E.	  412.	  .	  .create[s]	  
certain	  privileges	  and	  a	  right	  to	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  be	  heard	  on	  factual	  and	  
legal	  grounds,	  which	  may	  include	  the	  right	  of	  a	  victim	  or	  patient	  who	  is	  represented	  
by	  counsel	  to	  be	  heard	  through	  counsel.	  However,	  these	  rights	  are	  subject	  to	  
reasonable	  limitations	  and	  the	  military	  judge	  retains	  appropriate	  discretion	  under	  
R.C.M.	  801.	  .	  .	  .”)	  
133	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1716,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  1044e	  (2014)).	  
134	  Id.	  	  
135	  Id.	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passage	  of	  NDAA	  2014.136	  	  
	  
D. The	  Procedural	  Paradox	  
	  
i. How	  M.R.E.	  412	  Should	  Be	  Applied	  Versus	  How	  M.R.E.	  
412	  Has	  Been	  applied.	  	  
	  
MRE	   412137	   is	   inapplicable	   at	   Article	   32	   hearings	   despite	  
                                                
136	  Id.	  	  
137 Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412.	  “Sex	  offense	  cases;	  relevance	  of	  alleged	  victim's	  sexual	  
behavior	  or	  sexual	  predisposition:	  	  
(a)	  Evidence	  generally	  inadmissible	  
The	  following	  evidence	  is	  not	  admissible	  in	  any	  proceeding	  involving	  an	  alleged	  
sexual	  offense	  except	  as	  provided	  in	  subdivisions	  (b)	  and	  (c):	  
(1)	  Evidence	  offered	  to	  prove	  that	  any	  alleged	  victim	  engaged	  in	  other	  
sexual	  behavior.	  
(2)	  Evidence	  offered	  to	  prove	  any	  alleged	  victim's	  sexual	  predisposition.	  
(b)	  Exceptions	  
(1)	  In	  a	  proceeding,	  the	  following	  evidence	  is	  admissible,	  if	  otherwise	  
admissible	  under	  these	  rules:	  
(A)	  evidence	  of	  specific	  instances	  of	  sexual	  behavior	  by	  the	  alleged	  
victim	  offered	  to	  prove	  that	  a	  person	  other	  than	  the	  accused	  was	  
the	  source	  of	  semen,	  injury,	  or	  other	  physical	  evidence;	  
(B)	  evidence	  of	  specific	  instances	  of	  sexual	  behavior	  by	  the	  alleged	  
victim	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  person	  accused	  of	  the	  sexual	  
misconduct	  offered	  by	  the	  accused	  to	  prove	  consent	  or	  by	  the	  
prosecution;	  and	  
(C)	  evidence	  the	  exclusion	  of	  which	  would	  violate	  the	  
constitutional	  rights	  of	  the	  accused.	  
(c)	  Procedure	  to	  determine	  admissibility	  
(1)	  A	  party	  intending	  to	  offer	  evidence	  under	  subsection	  (b)	  must-­‐-­‐	  
(A)	  file	  a	  written	  motion	  at	  least	  5	  days	  prior	  to	  entry	  of	  pleas	  
specifically	  describing	  the	  evidence	  and	  stating	  the	  purpose	  for	  
which	  it	  is	  offered	  unless	  the	  military	  judge,	  for	  good	  cause	  shown,	  
requires	  a	  different	  time	  for	  filing	  or	  permits	  filing	  during	  trial;	  and	  
(B)	  serve	  the	  motion	  on	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  the	  military	  judge	  
and	  notify	  the	  alleged	  victim	  or,	  when	  appropriate,	  the	  alleged	  
victim's	  guardian	  or	  representative.	  
(2)	  Before	  admitting	  evidence	  under	  this	  rule,	  the	  military	  judge	  must	  
conduct	  a	  hearing,	  which	  shall	  be	  closed.	  At	  this	  hearing,	  the	  parties	  may	  
call	  witnesses,	  including	  the	  alleged	  victim,	  and	  offer	  relevant	  evidence.	  
The	  alleged	  victim	  must	  be	  afforded	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  
and	  be	  heard.	  In	  a	  case	  before	  a	  court-­‐martial	  composed	  of	  a	  military	  judge	  
and	  members,	  the	  military	  judge	  shall	  conduct	  the	  hearing	  outside	  the	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statutory	   language	   requiring	   MRE	   412	   to	   apply	   at	   Article	   32	  
hearings.138	  MRE	  412	  requires	  a	  party	   intending	  to	  offer	  evidence	  to	  
file	   a	  written	  motion	   at	   least	   five	   days	   prior	   to	   entry	   of	   a	   plea	   that	  
specifically	  describes	  the	  evidence	  and	  states	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  it	  
is	  offered.	   “139	  The	  party	   intending	   to	  offer	  evidence	  under	   this	   rule	  
must	  also	  “serve	   the	  motion	  on	   the	  opposing	  party	  and	   the	  military	  
judge	   and	   notify	   the	   alleged	   victim….”140	   Before	   admitting	   evidence	  
under	  this	  rule,	  the	  military	  judge	  must	  conduct	  a	  hearing,	  which	  shall	  
be	   closed.”141	   “The	   motion,	   related	   papers,	   and	   the	   record	   of	   the	  
hearing	  must	  be	  sealed	  and	  remain	  under	  seal	  unless	  the	  court	  orders	  
otherwise.”142	  
Prior	   to	   1993,	   MRE	   303143,	   the	   rule	   regarding	   degrading	  
                                                                                                                
presence	  of	  the	  members	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  39(a).	  The	  motion,	  related	  
papers,	  and	  the	  record	  of	  the	  hearing	  must	  be	  sealed	  and	  remain	  under	  
seal	  unless	  the	  court	  orders	  otherwise.	  
(3)	  If	  the	  military	  judge	  determines	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  hearing	  described	  in	  
paragraph	  (2)	  of	  this	  subsection	  that	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  accused	  seeks	  to	  
offer	  is	  relevant	  for	  a	  purpose	  under	  subsection	  (b)	  and	  that	  the	  probative	  
value	  of	  such	  evidence	  outweighs	  the	  danger	  of	  unfair	  prejudice	  to	  the	  
alleged	  victim's	  privacy,	  such	  evidence	  shall	  be	  admissible	  under	  this	  rule	  to	  
the	  extent	  an	  order	  made	  by	  the	  military	  judge	  specifies	  evidence	  that	  may	  
be	  offered	  and	  areas	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  the	  alleged	  victim	  may	  be	  
examined	  or	  cross-­‐examined.	  Such	  evidence	  is	  still	  subject	  to	  challenge	  
under	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  403.	  
(d)	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  rule,	  the	  term	  “sexual	  offense”	  includes	  any	  sexual	  
misconduct	  punishable	  under	  the	  Uniform	  Code	  of	  Military	  Justice,	  federal	  law	  or	  
state	  law.	  “Sexual	  behavior”	  includes	  any	  sexual	  behavior	  not	  encompassed	  by	  the	  
alleged	  offense.	  The	  term	  “sexual	  predisposition”	  refers	  to	  an	  alleged	  victim's	  mode	  
of	  dress,	  speech,	  or	  lifestyle	  that	  does	  not	  directly	  refer	  to	  sexual	  activities	  or	  
thoughts	  but	  that	  may	  have	  a	  sexual	  connotation	  for	  the	  factfinder.	  
(e)	  A	  “nonconsensual	  sexual	  offense”	  is	  a	  sexual	  offense	  in	  which	  consent	  by	  the	  
victim	  is	  an	  affirmative	  defense	  or	  in	  which	  the	  lack	  of	  consent	  is	  an	  element	  of	  the	  
offense.	  This	  term	  includes	  rape,	  forcible	  sodomy,	  assault	  with	  intent	  to	  commit	  
rape	  or	  forcible	  sodomy,	  indecent	  assault,	  and	  attempts	  to	  commit	  such	  offenses.”	  	  
Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412. 
138	  See	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  1101(d)	  (“(“[The]	  [MRE],	  other	  than	  with	  respect	  to	  privileges	  
and	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412,	  do	  not	  apply	  in	  investigative	  hearings	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  32.	  .	  .”)	  
139	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412(c)(1)(A).	  
140	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412(c)(1)(B).	  
141	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412	  (c)(2)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
142	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412	  (c)(2).	  
143	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  303.	  “Degrading	  questions:	  No	  person	  may	  be	  compelled	  to	  make	  a	  
statement	  or	  produce	  evidence	  before	  any	  military	  tribunal	  if	  the	  statement	  or	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questions,	   was	   the	   “means	   by	   which	   the	   substance	   of	   MRE	   412	  
applie[d]	   to	   Article	   32	   proceedings,	   and	   no	   person	   [would]	   be	  
compelled	   to	   answer	   a	   question	   that	   would	   be	   prohibited	   by	   Rule	  
412.”144	   In	   MRE	   303’s	   comments	   discussing	   MRE	   412’s	   application	  
before	  the	  1993	  amendment,	  the	  analysis	  states:	  	  
	  
It	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   it	  would	   clearly	   be	   unreasonable	   to	  
suggest	  that	  Congress	   in	  protecting	  the	  victims	  of	  sexual	  offenses	  
from	   the	   degrading	   and	   irrelevant	   cross-­‐examination	   formerly	  
typical	  of	  sexual	  cases	  would	  have	  intended	  to	  permit	  the	  identical	  
examination	   at	   a	   military	   preliminary	   hearing	   that	   is	   not	   even	  
presided	  over	  by	  a	  legally	  trained	  individual.145	  
	  
In	   1993,	   RCM	   405(i)	   and	  MRE	   1101(d)	   were	   amended	   to	   make	   the	  
provisions	  of	  MRE	  412	  applicable	  at	  pretrial	  investigations.146	  The	  MRE	  
303	  analysis	  states:	  “[The	  1993	  Amendment]	  ensure[s]	  that	  the	  same	  
protections	  afforded	  victims	  of	  nonconsensual	  sex	  offenses	  at	  trial	  are	  
available	  at	  pretrial	  hearings.”147	  	  
The	  analysis	  for	  MRE	  412	  states	  in	  part:	  
	  
Rule	  412	   is	   intended	  to	  shield	  victims	  of	  sexual	  assaults	   from	  the	  
often	   embarrassing	   and	   degrading	   cross-­‐examination	   and	   evi-­‐
dence	  presentations	  common	  to	  prosecutions	  of	  such	  offenses.	  In	  
so	  doing,	  it	  recognizes	  that	  the	  prior	  rule,	  which	  it	  replaces,	  often	  
yields	   evidence	   of	   at	   best	   minimal	   probative	   value	   with	   great	  
potential	   for	   distraction	   and	   incidentally	   discourages	   both	   the	  
reporting	  and	  prosecution	  of	  many	  sexual	  assaults.148	  
	  
Like	  MRE	  303’s	  analysis,	  MRE	  412’s	  analysis	  section	  states:	  	  
	  
1993	   Amendment.	   R.C.M.	   405(i)	   and	   Mil.	   R.	   Evid.	   1101(d)	   were	  
amended	  to	  make	  the	  provisions	  of	  Rule	  412	  applicable	  at	  pretrial	  
investigations.	   Congress	   intended	   to	   protect	   the	   victims	   of	  
nonconsensual	  sex	  crimes	  at	  preliminary	  hearings	  as	  well	  as	  at	  trial	  
when	  it	  passed	  Fed.	  R.	  Evid.	  412.149	  
                                                                                                                
evidence	  is	  not	  material	  to	  the	  issue	  and	  may	  tend	  to	  degrade	  that	  person.”	  
144	  Manual	  for	  Courts–Martial,	  United	  States,	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Military	  Rules	  of	  
Evidence	  app.	  22	  at	  A22–9	  (2012	  ed.)	  (hereinafter	  “Manual	  for	  Courts-­‐Martial”).	  
145	  Id.	  	  
146	  Id.	  (discussing	  the	  1993	  Amendment).	  	  
147	  Id.	  	  
148	  Id.	  at	  A22–36.	  
149	  Id.	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In	   1998,	  MRE	   412	  was	   amended	   again	   to	  more	   closely	   resemble	   its	  
civilian	   counterpart.	   In	   discussing	   MRE	   412’s	   replacement	   of	   an	   in	  
camera	  procedure	  with	  a	  closed	  hearing,	  the	  analysis	  states:	  	  
	  
[A]	   closed	   hearing	   was	   substituted	   for	   the	   in	   camera	   hearing	  
required	   by	   the	   Federal	   Rule.	  Given	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   in	   camera	  
procedure	  used	  in	  Military	  Rule	  of	  Evidence	  505(i)(4),	  and	  that	  an	  
in	  camera	  hearing	   in	   the	  district	   courts	  more	  closely	   resembles	  a	  
closed	  hearing	  conducted	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  39(a),	  the	  latter	  was	  
adopted	   as	   better	   suited	   to	   trial	   by	   courts-­‐martial.	   Any	   alleged	  
victim	  is	  afforded	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  and	  be	  heard	  
at	   the	  closed	  Article	  39(a)	  hearing.	  The	  closed	  hearing,	  combined	  
with	  the	  new	  requirement	  to	  seal	  the	  motion,	  related	  papers,	  and	  
the	  record	  of	   the	  hearing,	   fully	  protects	  an	  alleged	  victim	  against	  
invasion	  of	  privacy	  and	  potential	  embarrassment.150	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   above	   language,	   MRE	   412	   has	   never	   been	  
amended	   to	   make	   the	   procedural	   requirements	   applicable	   in	   an	  
Article	   32	   hearing.	  MRE	   412’s	   procedural	   requirements	   as	   currently	  
written	  state	  in	  relevant	  part:	  	  
	  
(c)	  Procedure	  to	  determine	  admissibility	  
(1)	   A	   party	   intending	   to	   offer	   evidence	   under	   subsection	   (b)	  
must-­‐-­‐	  
(A)	   file	   a	   written	  motion	   at	   least	   5	   days	   prior	   to	   entry	   of	  
pleas	   specifically	   describing	   the	   evidence	   and	   stating	   the	  
purpose	  for	  which	  it	  is	  offered	  unless	  the	  military	  judge,	  for	  
good	   cause	   shown,	   requires	   a	   different	   time	   for	   filing	   or	  
permits	  filing	  during	  trial;	  and	  
(B)	  serve	  the	  motion	  on	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  the	  military	  
judge	   and	   notify	   the	   alleged	   victim	   or,	   when	   appropriate,	  
the	  alleged	  victim's	  guardian	  or	  representative.	  
(2)	   Before	   admitting	   evidence	   under	   this	   rule,	   the	   military	  
judge	  must	   conduct	   a	   hearing,	   which	   shall	   be	   closed.	   At	   this	  
hearing,	   the	   parties	  may	   call	   witnesses,	   including	   the	   alleged	  
victim,	  and	  offer	  relevant	  evidence.	  The	  alleged	  victim	  must	  be	  
afforded	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  and	  be	  heard.	  In	  a	  
case	  before	  a	   court-­‐martial	   composed	  of	  a	  military	   judge	  and	  
members,	  the	  military	  judge	  shall	  conduct	  the	  hearing	  outside	  
the	   presence	   of	   the	   members	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   39(a).	   The	  
motion,	  related	  papers,	  and	  the	  record	  of	  the	  hearing	  must	  be	  
sealed	   and	   remain	   under	   seal	   unless	   the	   court	   orders	  
otherwise.	  
                                                
150	  Id.	  at	  A22–37.	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(3)	  If	  the	  military	  judge	  determines	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  hearing	  .	  
.	  .	  .	  151	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   supra,	   MRE	   412(c)’s	   procedural	   requirements	  
mandate	  at	   least	   five	  day’s	  notice	  prior	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  a	  plea	  by	  the	  
party	   intending	  to	  offer	  MRE	  412	  evidence.152	  However,	   fulfilling	  this	  
requirement	   before	   the	   end	   of	   an	   Article	   32	   hearing	   is	   impossible	  
because	  the	  accused	  cannot	  enter	  a	  plea	  until	  the	  CA	  refers	  the	  case	  
to	  a	  court-­‐martial.153	  The	  CA	  cannot	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  a	  court-­‐martial	  
without	  probable	   cause,	  which	   is	  determined,	  at	   least	   in	  part,	  by	  an	  
Article	   32	   hearing.154	   The	   entry	   of	   pleas	   is	   done	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	  
trial,	  ordinarily	  at	  arraignment,	  unless	  deferred	  by	  defense	  counsel	  to	  
a	   later	   time.155	   Thus,	   because	   the	   event	   referenced	   in	  MRE	   412(c)’s	  
notice	  requirement	  cannot	  take	  place	  until	  after	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  
concludes,	   MRE	   412(c)	   procedural	   gatekeeping	   cannot	   be	  
implemented.	   Despite	   the	   1993	   amendment’s	   optimistic	   language,	  
“the	  same	  protections	  afforded	  victims	  of	  nonconsensual	  sex	  offenses	  
                                                
151	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412(c).	  
152	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412(c)(1)(A).	  
153	  R.C.M.	  601(d)(2).	  	  
154	  R.C.M.	  405(a)	  (“[N]o	  charge	  or	  specification	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  
general	  court-­‐martial	  for	  trial	  until	  a	  thorough	  and	  impartial	  
investigation	  of	  all	  the	  matters	  set	  forth	  therein	  has	  been	  made	  in	  
substantial	  compliance	  with	  this	  rule.	  Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  this	  rule	  
shall	  have	  no	  effect	  if	  the	  charges	  are	  not	  referred	  to	  a	  general	  court-­‐
martial.”)	  
155	  See	  R.C.M.	  910;	  R.C.M.	  904;	  See	  also	  R.C.M.	  910(e)	  (Discussion).	  (“Before	  the	  plea	  
is	  accepted,	  the	  accused	  must	  admit	  every	  element	  of	  the	  offense(s)	  to	  which	  the	  
accused	  pleaded	  guilty.	  Ordinarily,	  the	  elements	  should	  be	  explained	  to	  the	  
accused.”);	  See	  also	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Le	  T.	  Zimmerman,	  USAF,	  The	  Trial	  Script	  
Everything	  You	  Didn't	  Even	  Know	  You	  Didn't	  Know,	  36	  NO.	  2	  The	  Reporter	  18,	  22	  
(2009)	  (citing	  R.C.M.	  904,	  Arraignment)	  (“Arraignment	  is	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  charges	  
and	  specifications	  to	  the	  accused	  and	  calling	  on	  the	  accused	  to	  plead.	  The	  entry	  of	  
the	  pleas	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  arraignment	  and	  the	  accused	  can	  ask	  to	  defer	  entry	  of	  
pleas;	  therefore,	  arraignment	  is	  complete	  when	  the	  military	  judge	  utters	  the	  words	  
“Accused,	  how	  do	  you	  plead?”	  The	  arraignment	  triggers	  certain	  legally	  significant	  
events;	  therefore,	  as	  counsel,	  you	  should	  listen	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  ask	  the	  accused	  to	  
plead	  and	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  consequences	  when	  requesting	  an	  arraignment,	  
especially	  if	  you	  don't	  plan	  to	  immediately	  proceed	  to	  trial.	  Once	  an	  accused	  is	  
arraigned,	  no	  additional	  charges	  may	  be	  referred	  against	  the	  accused	  to	  that	  court-­‐
martial.”)	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at	  trial	  are	  [not]	  available	  at	  pretrial	  hearings.156	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  MRE	  412’s	  explicit	  language,	  recent	  case	  law	  has	  
attempted	  to	  explain	  the	  rule’s	  application.	  The	  highest	  military	  court	  
tried	   to	   clarify	   the	   application	   of	   the	   rule	   in	   2011.157	   The	   following	  
excerpt	   from	   a	   2013	   Air	   Force	   Court	   of	   Criminal	   Appeals	   case	  
illustrates	  the	  application	  of	  MRE	  412:	  
	  
[E]vidence	   of	   a	   victim's	   past	   sexual	   behavior	   is	   inadmissible	   in	   a	  
case	   involving	   an	   alleged	   sex	   offense.	   Evidence	   offered	   to	   prove	  
that	   any	   alleged	   victim	   engaged	   in	   other	   sexual	   behavior	   is	   not	  
admissible	   in	   any	   proceeding	   involving	   an	   alleged	   sexual	   offense	  
except	   as	   provided	   in	   [Mil.	   R.	   Evid.	   412]	   subdivisions	   (b)	   and	   (c).	  
Subdivision	   (b)	   provides	   three	   exceptions	   to	   this	   general	   rule	   of	  
exclusion.	   The	   third	   of	   these	   exceptions,	   the	   constitutionally	  
required	   exception,	   permits	   the	   admission	   of	   evidence	   the	  
exclusion	   of	   which	   would	   violate	   the	   constitutional	   rights	   of	   the	  
accused.	  Mil.	  R.	  Evid.	  412(c)	  provides	  the	  procedure	  to	  determine	  
the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  offered	  under	   the	   three	  exceptions.	  
This	   procedure	   includes	   the	  Mil.	   R.	   Evid.	   412	   balancing	   test,	   .	   .	   .	  	  
[The]	   [balancing]	   [test]	   [provides]	   [that]	   [i]f	   the	   military	   judge	  
determines	  ...	  that	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  accused	  seeks	  to	  offer	  is	  
relevant	  for	  a	  purpose	  under	  subsection	  (b)	  and	  that	  the	  probative	  
value	  of	  such	  evidence	  outweighs	  the	  danger	  of	  unfair	  prejudice	  to	  
the	   alleged	   victim's	   privacy,	   such	   evidence	   shall	   be	   admissible	  
under	  this	  rule	  to	  the	  extent	  an	  order	  made	  by	  the	  military	  judge	  
specifies	  evidence	  that	  may	  be	  offered	  and	  areas	  with	   respect	   to	  
which	   the	   alleged	   victim	   may	   be	   examined	   or	   cross-­‐examined.	  
Such	  evidence	   is	  still	  subject	  to	  challenge	  under	  Mil.	  R.	  Evid.	  403.	  
Evidence	  may	   be	   admitted	   under	  Mil.	   R.	   Evid.	   412(b)(1)(C)	  when	  
the	   evidence	   is	   relevant,	   material,	   and	   its	   probative	   value	  
outweighs	   the	   dangers	   of	   unfair	   prejudice.	   Relevant	   evidence	   is	  
any	  evidence	  that	  has	  any	  tendency	  to	  make	  the	  existence	  of	  any	  
fact	   ...	  more	   probable	   or	   less	   probable	   than	   it	  would	   be	  without	  
the	  evidence.	  The	  evidence	  must	  also	  be	  material,	  which	  requires	  
looking	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  issue	  for	  which	  the	  evidence	  was	  
offered	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	   issues	   in	  th[e]	  case;	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	   th[e]	   issue	   is	   in	   dispute;	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   other	  
evidence	   in	   the	   case	   pertaining	   to	   th[at]	   issue.	   If	   evidence	   is	  
material	  and	  relevant,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  admitted	  under	  subsection	  
(b)(1)(c)	  when	   the	  accused,	  under	   the	  Mil.	  R.	  Evid.	  412	  balancing	  
test,	  can	  show	  that	  the	  probative	  value	  of	  the	  evidence	  outweighs	  
                                                
156 Manual	  for	  Courts-­‐Martial,	  supra	  note	  144,	  at	  A22–9	  (discussing	  the	  1993	  
Amendment). 
157	  United	  States	  v.	  Gaddis,	  70	  M.J.	  248	  (C.A.A.F.	  2011).	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the	   dangers	   of	   unfair	   prejudice	   to	   the	   victim's	   privacy.	   If	   the	  
military	   judge,	  after	   then	  applying	   the	  Mil.	  R.	  Evid.	  403	  balancing	  
test,	  finds	  that	  the	  probative	  value	  of	  the	  evidence	  outweighs	  the	  
danger	   of	   unfair	   prejudice,	   it	   is	   admissible	   no	   matter	   how	  
embarrassing	   it	   might	   be	   to	   the	   alleged	   victim.	   Unfair	   dangers	  
include	   concerns	   about	   harassment,	   prejudice,	   confusion	   of	   the	  
issues,	   the	   witness'	   safety,	   or	   interrogation	   that	   is	   repetitive	   or	  
only	  marginally	   relevant.	   Likewise,	   if	   a	  military	   judge	   determines	  
that	   the	   evidence	   is	   not	   constitutionally	   required,	   the	   military	  
judge	  must	  exclude	  the	  evidence	  under	  Mil.	  R.	  Evid.	  412	  because	  
the	   evidence	   does	   not	   fall	   under	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   rule	   of	  
exclusion.	  158	  
	  
MRE	  412	  as	  currently	  written	  requires	  that	  a	  closed	  hearing	  by	  
a	  military	  judge	  occur	  before	  admitting	  MRE	  412	  evidence	  and	  for	  the	  
record	   of	   the	   closed	   hearing	   to	   remain	   sealed.159	   No	   MRE	   412(c)	  
closed	   hearings	   were	   conducted	   in	   the	   2013	   Naval	   Academy	   case	  
discussed	  supra.	  If	  MRE	  412(c)	  was	  amended	  to	  make	  closed	  hearings	  
possible	   for	   MRE	   412	   Article	   32	   purposes,	   maybe	   the	   abuses	   that	  
occurred	  in	  Maryland	  would	  have	  been	  avoided.	  The	  MCM	  should	  be	  
amended	   to	   add	   specific	   procedural	   requirements	   to	   accommodate	  
pretrial	  proceedings.	  
The	   MRE	   412’s	   mandated	   applicability	   at	   pretrial	   hearings	  
mixed	  with	  its	  apparent	  lack	  of	  procedural	  requirements	  specific	  to	  a	  
pre-­‐trial	   setting	   create	   a	   paradox.	   To	   further	   add	   to	   the	   confusion,	  
under	  RCM	  405,	  the	  investigating	  officer	  is	  not	  required	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  
admissibility	  of	  evidence.160	  An	  investigating	  officer	  may	  consider	  any	  
evidence,	  even	  if	  that	  evidence	  would	  not	  be	  admissible	  at	  trial.”161	  	  
An	  Article	   32	   IO	   “is	   not	   required	   to	   rule	   on	  objections,	   [but]	  
may	  take	  corrective	  action	  in	  response	  to	  an	  objection	  as	  to	  matters	  
relating	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   proceedings	   when	   the	   [IO]	   believes	  
such	  action	  is	  appropriate.”162	  Additionally,	  the	  IO	  “is	  not	  required	  to	  
rule	   on	   the	   admissibility	   of	   evidence	   and	   need	   not	   consider	   such	  
matters	   except	   as	   the	   [IO]	   deems	   necessary	   to	   an	   informed	  
                                                
158	  United	  States	  v.	  Evans,	  ACM	  38218,	  2013	  WL	  6913159,	  at	  *3	  (A.F.	  Ct.	  Crim.	  App.	  
Dec.	  3,	  2013)	  review	  denied,	  14-­‐0381/AF,	  2014	  WL	  1760008	  (C.A.A.F.	  Apr.	  3,	  2014)	  
(internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted).	  	  	  
159	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  412	  (c).	  
160	  R.C.M.	  405(h)(2);	  R.C.M.	  405(h)(2)	  (Discussion).	  	  
161	  R.C.M.	  405(i)	  (Discussion).	  	  
162	  R.C.M.	  405(h)(2)	  (Discussion).	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recommendation.”163	   Case	   law	   has	   extrapolated	   on	   the	   types	   of	  
corrective	  action	  an	  IO	  may	  take.	  For	  instance:	  1)	  An	  IO	  conducting	  a	  
pretrial	   investigation	   can	   restrict	   defense	   cross-­‐examination	   of	  
government	   witnesses	   at	   investigation,	   to	   prevent	   defense	   counsel	  
from	  merely	   rephrasing	   questions	   five,	   six	   or	   seven	   times164;	   2)	   An	  
Article	   32	   pretrial	   investigation	   is	   judicial	   in	   nature,	   and	   the	   IO	  
presiding	   over	   investigation	   has	   an	   obligation	   to	   regulate	   matters	  
before	  him	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  hearing	  is	  fair	  and	  impartial;	  and	  3)	  An	  
IO	  presiding	  over	  Article	  32	  pretrial	  investigation	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  
limit	  redundant,	  repetitive	  or	  irrelevant	  questions.165	  	  
The	  RCM	  provide	  no	  practical	  guidance	  beyond	   the	  ability	  of	  
“the	  [IO]	  may	  take	  corrective	  action	  in	  response	  to	  an	  objection	  as	  to	  
matters	   relating	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   proceedings	   when	   the	   IO	  
believes	   such	   action	   is	   appropriate.”166	   Furthermore,	   “[i]f	   an	  
objection	   raises	   a	   substantial	   question	   about	   a	   matter	   within	   the	  
authority	  of	  the	  commander	  who	  directed	  the	  investigation	  .	  .	  .	  the	  IO	  
should	   promptly	   inform	   the	   commander	   who	   directed	   the	  
investigation.167	   However,	   what	   happens	   after	   the	   IO	   informs	   his	  
commander	  and	  returns	  to	  finish	  the	  hearing?	  How	  does	  the	  MRE	  412	  
issue	   go	   away?	   How	   does	   the	   IO	   informing	   his	   commander	   fix	   the	  
evidentiary	  concerns?	   If	  MRE	  412	   is	   intended	  to	  act	  as	  a	  rape	  shield	  
and	  protect	   victims	   from	   improper	  questioning	  but	   the	  only	  powers	  
the	  IO	  has	  is	  to	  note	  an	  objection	  in	  a	  report,	  and	  the	  IO	  is	  not	  bound	  
by	  the	  rules	  of	  evidence,	  how	  are	  victims	  protected?	  	  
Because	   both	   the	  MRE	   and	  RCM	  apply	  with	   equal	   authority,	  
when	   applied	   in	   conjunction	  with	   one	   another	   they	   lead	   to	   a	   dead	  
end.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  MRE	  412’s	  procedural	  inapplicability	  in	  Article	  32	  
hearings,	  the	  IO	  uses	  his	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  hearing	  
as	  a	  way	  to	  prevent	  the	  victim	  from	  abuse.	  This	  standard	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  IO’s	  subjective	  “my	  gut	  says	  this	  does	  not	  feel	  right”	  standard.	  An	  
IO’s	   conduct	   determinations	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   limit	   relief	   on	  
appeal	   due	   to	   its	   non-­‐legally	   based	   subjective	   standard.	   The	   law	   is	  
unclear	  on	  how	  an	   IO’s	  conduct	  determinations	  will	  be	   reviewed	  on	  
                                                
163	  R.C.M.	  405(e)	  (Discussion).	  
164	  United	  States	  v.	  Lewis,	  33	  M.J.	  758,	  762	  (A.C.M.R.	  1991)	  aff'd,	  36	  M.J.	  299	  (C.M.A.	  
1993)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	  
165	  Id.	  at	  763	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	  
166	  R.C.M.	  405	  (h)(2)	  (Discussion).	  	  
167	  Id.	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appeal.	  
What	  happens	   if	   the	   IO	  does	  not	  want	  to	  rule	  on	  evidentiary	  
objections?168	  For	  instance,	  if	  an	  IO	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  defendant	  the	  
right	   to	   thoroughly	   cross-­‐examine	  a	   key	  witness	   against	  him	  or	  her,	  
over	  the	  accused’s	  objections,	  and	  the	  accused	  moves	  the	  trial	  court	  
to	  cure	  Article	  32	  defects	  before	  trial	  on	  the	  merits,	  the	  accused	  will	  
be	  entitled	  to	  relief	  without	  needing	  to	  show	  prejudice.169	  	  Thus,	  the	  
defendant	   at	   least	   has	   an	   explicit	   procedural	   mechanism	   to	   cure	  
legitimate	  Article	  32	  defects.	  However,	  what	  happens	   if	   the	   IO	  does	  
not	  want	  to	  rule	  on	  evidentiary	  objections	  posed	  by	  the	  government	  
in	  the	  event	  defense	  counsel	   is	  abusively	  cross-­‐examining	  an	  alleged	  
victim?	   I	   searched	   military	   case	   law	   and	   the	   MCM	   to	   find	   what	  
remedy	   the	   government	   has	   to	   cure	   Article	   32	   defects.	   I	   spoke	   to	  
three	  high-­‐ranking	  JAGs	  from	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces,	  
and	   they	   all	   said	   the	   same	   thing:	   There	   is	   no	   explicit	   procedural	  
remedy	  for	  the	  government	  to	  cure	  Article	  32	  defects.170	  
Several	   JAGs	   confirmed	   the	   procedural	   defectiveness	   of	   the	  
current	   military	   justice	   system,	   noting	   the	   lack	   of	   explicit	   statutory	  
avenues	   for	   government	   relief	   to	   cure	   alleged	   defects	   in	   Article	   32	  
hearings.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  event	  an	  IO	  attempted	  to	  let	  in	  the	  type	  
of	  evidence	   that	  would	  normally	  be	  prohibited	  under	  MRE	  412	   (c)’s	  
closed	   hearing	   and	   advance	   written	   notice	   requirements,	   the	  
                                                
168 See	  R.C.M.	  405(h)(2).	   
169	  United	  States	  v.	  Davis,	  64	  M.J.	  445,	  449	  (C.A.A.F.	  2007)	  (“The	  UCMJ	  and	  the	  
Manual	  for	  Courts–Martial	  provide	  an	  accused	  with	  a	  substantial	  set	  of	  rights	  at	  an	  
Article	  32	  proceeding.	  .	  .	  .	  As	  a	  general	  matter,	  an	  accused	  is	  required	  to	  identify	  and	  
object	  to	  any	  errors	  in	  the	  Article	  32	  proceeding	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  court-­‐martial,	  
prior	  to	  trial	  on	  the	  merits.	  .	  .	  .	  When	  an	  accused	  makes	  an	  objection	  at	  that	  stage,	  
the	  impact	  of	  an	  Article	  32	  violation	  on	  the	  trial	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  speculative	  at	  best.	  
The	  time	  for	  correction	  of	  such	  an	  error	  is	  when	  the	  military	  judge	  can	  fashion	  an	  
appropriate	  remedy	  under	  R.C.M.	  906(b)(3)	  before	  it	  infects	  the	  trial,	  not	  after	  the	  
members,	  witnesses,	  and	  parties	  have	  borne	  the	  burden	  of	  trial	  proceedings.	  .	  .	  .	  In	  
the	  event	  that	  an	  accused	  disagrees	  with	  the	  military	  judge's	  ruling,	  the	  accused	  
may	  file	  a	  petition	  for	  extraordinary	  relief	  to	  address	  immediately	  the	  Article	  32	  
error.	  .	  .	  .”(internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted));	  see	  United	  States	  v.	  Davis,	  62	  
M.J.	  645,	  647	  (A.F.	  Ct.	  Crim.	  App.	  2006)	  aff'd,	  64	  M.J.	  445	  (C.A.A.F.	  2007)	  (holding	  if	  
an	  accused	  is	  deprived	  of	  a	  substantial	  pretrial	  right	  on	  timely	  objection,	  he	  is	  
entitled	  to	  judicial	  enforcement	  of	  his	  right,	  without	  regard	  to	  whether	  such	  
enforcement	  will	  benefit	  him	  at	  the	  trial).	  	  
170	  Telephone	  &	  E-­‐mail	  Interviews	  with	  JAGs,	  who	  requested	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  
(Thursday,	  May	  22,	  2014).	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government	  would	  stop	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  and	  demand	  that	  the	  
IO	  speak	  with	  his	   independent	  legal	  advisor.	   If,	  after	  speaking	  to	  the	  
independent	  legal	  advisor,	  the	  IO	  continued	  to	  allow	  prohibited	  cross-­‐
examination,	  the	  government	  would	  speak	  to	  CA	  to	  potentially	  seek	  a	  
new	  IO.	  However,	  the	  RCM	  905(b)(1)	  pretrial	  motion	  option	  available	  
for	   the	   accused	   is	   not	   available	   for	   the	   government.171	   The	  
government	   should	   be	   able	   to	   petition	   to	   the	   trial	   court	   judge	   to	  
review	   Article	   32	   abuses.	   	   Other	   JAGs,	   who	   wish	   to	   remain	  
anonymous,	   share	   similar	   concerns	  about	   the	  clear	   lack	  of	  guidance	  
regarding	  how	  the	  Article	  32	  IO	  is	  supposed	  to	  make	  preliminary	  MRE	  
412	   admissibility	   determinations	   during	   the	   pretrial	   hearing,	  
especially	  when	  one	  of	  the	  procedural	  requirements,	  five	  day’s-­‐notice	  
of	   intent	   to	  offer	  MRE	  412	  evidence,	   is	   required	   to	  be	   filed	  prior	   to	  
the	  entry	  of	  pleas.	  	  
Currently,	   the	   system	   is	   rigged	   for	  abuse	  because	  of	  a	  major	  
problem	   with	   the	   military	   justice	   system’s	   procedures.	   However,	  
there	   is	   a	   simple	   solution.	   Both	   MRE	   412	   and	   RCM	   405	   should	   be	  
amended	   to	   make	   MRE	   412	   practically	   applicable	   in	   Article	   32	  
hearings.	   If	   a	   defendant	  wants	   to	   offer	   in	   evidence	   that	   falls	  within	  
the	   ambit	   of	   412,	   then	   they	  must	   follow	   the	   procedures	   laid	   out	   in	  
MRE	   412(c).	   This	   is	   not	   a	   revolutionary	   idea.	   The	   rule	   requires	  
procedures	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  benefit	  the	  victim	  from	  embarrassing	  
and	  degrading	  testimony	  and	  ensures	  that	  the	  accused	   is	  entitled	  to	  
evidence,	   the	   exclusion	   of	   which	   would	   violate	   his	   or	   her	  
constitutional	   rights.172	   My	   remedy	   calls	   for	   enforcing	   procedures	  
already	  required	  to	  be	  enforced	  by	  both	  the	  MRE	  and	  the	  RCM.	  If	  the	  
rule	  is	  properly	  enforced,	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  sexual	  assault	  victims	  
face	   in	   initially	   coming	   forward	   and	   in	   pretrial	   hearings	   will	   be	  
alleviated.	  	  
	  
                                                
171	  R.C.M.	  905(b)(1)	  (“Any	  defense,	  objection,	  or	  request	  which	  is	  capable	  of	  
determination	  without	  the	  trial	  of	  the	  general	  issue	  of	  guilt	  may	  be	  raised	  before	  
trial.	  The	  following	  must	  be	  raised	  before	  a	  plea	  is	  entered:	  Defenses	  or	  objections	  
based	  on	  defects	  (other	  than	  jurisdictional	  defects)	  in	  the	  preferral,	  forwarding,	  
investigation	  or	  referral	  of	  charges;	  .	  .	  .”);	  R.C.M.	  905	  (Discussion)	  (“Such	  non-­‐
jurisdictional	  defects	  include	  unsworn	  charges,	  inadequate	  Article	  32	  investigation,	  .	  .	  .”)	  	  
172	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Gaddis,	  70	  M.J.	  248	  (C.A.A.F.	  2011).	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ii. A	   Legally	   Trained	   Hearing	   Officer	   “Whenever	  
Practicable”173	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   legally	   trained	   IOs	   either	   attempting	   to	   or	   not	  
employing	  MRE	  412	  at	  all	   in	  pretrial	  hearings,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
loophole	  in	  NDAA	  2014’s	  language	  to	  continue	  to	  allow	  for	  non-­‐legally	  
trained	  IOs	  is	  equally,	  if	  not	  more,	  problematic.	  The	  2014	  amendment	  
dealing	  with	  the	   legal	  qualifications	  of	   investigating	  officers	   is	  not	  an	  
absolute	   ban	   on	   non-­‐legally	   IOs	   at	   Article	   32	   hearings.	   The	   problem	  
with	   the	   2014	   amendment	   to	   §	   832(b)	   is	   the	   statute’s	   “whenever	  
practicable”	  language174.	  “Practicable”	  is	  not	  statutorily	  defined	  in	  the	  
UCMJ;	  however,	  military	  courts	  have	  interpreted	  “practicable”	  in	  non-­‐
Article	   32	   contexts.	   Regarding	   an	  Article	   62	   government	   appeal,	   the	  
highest	  military	  court	  stated:	  “[P]racticable	  [is]	  not	  statutorily	  defined,	  
but	  surely	  [its]	  plain	  English	  meaning	  is	  clear—the	  case	  is	  supposed	  to	  
move	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  line	  if	  feasible.”175	  	  
Other	  military	  courts	  have	  similarly	  concluded	  that	  “practicable”	  is	  
generally	   synonymous	   with	   “if	   feasible”.	   Therefore,	   the	   “whenever	  
practicable”	   language	  provides	  for	  an	  opportunity	  where,	   if	  the	  use	  of	  a	  
JAG	   to	   serve	   as	   an	   IO	   is	   not	   feasible,	   then	   the	   IO	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	  
legally	  trained,	  so	  long	  as	  a	  JAG	  is	  available	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  legal	  advisor	  to	  
the	   non-­‐legally	   trained	   IO.176	   Presumably,	   there	   will	   be	   situations177	  
where	  the	  use	  of	  a	  JAG	  will	  not	  be	  feasible,178	  resulting	  in	  a	  deprivation	  of	  
both	   party’s	   rights	   due	   to	   a	   non-­‐legally	   trained	   IO’s	   incompetency	   on	  
legal	   matters.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   “whenever	   practicable”	   language	   in	  
§832(b),	   none	   of	   the	   Article	   32	   amendments	   go	   into	   effect	   until	  
December	  26,	  2014.179	  	  
                                                
173	  See	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832	  (2014).	  	  
174	  See	  10	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  832(b)	  (2014).	  
175	  United	  States	  v.	  Danylo,	  73	  M.J.	  183,	  190	  (C.A.A.F.	  2014)	  (interpreting	  
“practicable”	  in	  an	  Article	  62	  appeal	  context,	  where,	  like	  in	  the	  Article	  32	  context,	  it	  
is	  similarly	  not	  defined)	  (emphasis	  added).	  
176	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832(b)	  (2014).	  	  
177	  David	  Vergun,	  New	  Law	  Brings	  Changes	  to	  Uniform	  Code	  of	  Military	  Justice,	  ARMY	  
NEWS	  SERVICE	  (Jan.	  8,	  2014),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121444.	  	  
178	  See	  Id.	  (describing	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  shortage	  of	  JAGs	  resulted	  in	  the	  inability	  to	  
provide	  legally	  trained	  IOs	  in	  the	  Army,	  prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  NDAA	  2014).	  	  	  
179	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	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  Stat	  672	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  §	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Regarding	   the	   NDAA	   2014	   Article	   32	   amendment’s	   “whenever	  
practicable”	   language,	   in	   a	   situation	  where	   there	   is	   a	   shortage	  of	   JAGs,	  
litigants	  will	  pay	  the	  price.	  A	  shortage	  of	  JAGs	  is	  cited	  by	  the	  policy	  branch	  
chief	   of	   the	   Army’s	   Criminal	   Law	   Division	   as	   the	   reason	   for	   not	   using	  
legally	   trained	   IOs	   in	  all	   instances	  prior	   to	   the	  2014	  amendment.180	  The	  
branch	   chief	   stated	   that	   JAGs	   did	   not	   always	   serve	   as	   Article	   32	   IOs	  
“largely	   because	   we	   try	   four	   times	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   of	   any	   of	   the	  
other	   services”	   and	   that	   legally	   trained	   IOs	   were	   not	   used	   exclusively	  
because	   of	   a	   shortage	   JAGs	   and	   the	   Army’s	   high	   volume	   of	   cases.181	  
Obviously	  a	  shortage	  of	  lawyers	  would	  make	  the	  use	  of	  legally	  trained	  IOs	  
not	   “practicable.”	   If	   JAGs	   were	   not	   being	   used	   at	   Article	   32	   hearings	  
because	  of	  a	  legal	  personnel	  shortage	  and	  the	  2014	  amendments	  do	  not	  
address	  the	  legal	  personnel	  shortage	  discussed	  supra,	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  
that	   there	  will	   be	   instances	  where	   non-­‐legally	   trained	   IOs	   preside	   over	  
Article	  32	  hearings,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  Army.	  	  
Assuming	   the	   military	   starts	   to	   enforce	   MRE	   412	   procedural	  
requirements	   at	   pretrial	   proceedings,	   how	   can	   someone	   with	   no	   legal	  
training	  enforce	  the	  rules	  of	  evidence	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way	  that	  would	  
not	  prejudice	  either	  the	  victims	  or	  the	  accused?	  How	  can	  someone	  with	  
no	  legal	  training	  enforce	  the	  rule’s	  protections	  in	  the	  event	  a	  deposition	  
is	   required?	   Especially	   when	   the	   highest	   military	   court	   in	   the	   United	  
States	   stated	   “[t]he	  M.R.E.	   412(c)(3)	   ‘balancing	   test’.	   .	   .is	   anything	   but	  
simple	  to	  understand	  or	  apply,	  but	  it	   is	  not	  facially	  unconstitutional.	   .	   .	   .	  
182	  To	  a	  certainty,	  though,	  it	  has	  done	  nothing	  but	  add	  additional	  layers	  of	  
confusion	  and	  uncertainty	  to	  the	  application	  of	  M.R.E.	  412.”183	  	  	  
Confusion	  for	  a	  judge	  trying	  to	  apply	  an	  evidentiary	  balancing	  test	  
and	   confusion	   for	   an	   IO,	   a	   legal	   layman,	   trying	   to	   apply	   the	   same	  
evidentiary	  balancing	  test	  are	  of	  a	  different	  magnitude.	  A	  trained	  judicial	  
officer	   has	   endured	   the	   rigors	   of	   law	   school,	   and	   has	   been	   trained	   to	  
think	   in	  a	  specific	  way.	  This	   legal	  training	  and	  experience	  makes	  a	   judge	  
more	  qualified	  to	  make	  these	  rulings	  than	  a	  person	  with	  no	  legal	  training.	  
An	   investigating	   officer	   should	   be	   required	   to	   possess	   formal	   legal	  
training	   because	   they	   make	   evidentiary	   rulings	   with	   the	   potential	   for	  
grave	   constitutional	   harms	   to	   both	   parties.	   It	   is	   not	   an	   unreasonable	  
requirement,	   considering	   the	   potential	   for	   great	   harm.	   IOs	   are	  
                                                
180	  Vergun,	  supra	  note	  177.	  	  
181	  Id.	  	  
182	  United	  States	  v.	  Gaddis,	  70	  M.J.	  248,	  253	  (C.A.A.F.	  2011).	  
183	  Id.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  325	  
significantly	   restricted	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   seek	   legal	   advice.	  An	  Article	   32	  
investigating	  officer	  violates	  his	   role	  as	   judicial	  officer	  when	  he	  receives	  
advice	  from	  an	  individual	  who	  serves	  in	  a	  prosecutorial	  function	  or	  when	  
he	   obtains	   advice	   from	   a	   non-­‐prosecutor	   advisor	   on	   a	   substantive	  
question	   without	   prior	   notice	   to	   all	   other	   parties.184	   Errors	   relating	   to	  
Article	   32	   investigations,	   when	   preserved	   by	   timely	   motion,	   will	   only	  
constitute	   grounds	   for	   reversal	  when	   the	   accused	  has	   been	  prejudiced;	  
however,	   prejudice	   is	   presumed	   when	   investigating	   officer	   receives	  
advice	  from	  an	  individual	  who	  serves	  in	  prosecutorial	  function	  or	  receives	  
advice	  from	  non-­‐prosecutor	  on	  substantive	  question	  without	  prior	  notice	  
to	   all	   other	   parties.185	   The	   highest	   military	   court	   included	   “evidentiary	  
standards”	   as	   an	   example	   of	   a	   substantive,	   rather	   than	   a	   procedural	  
matter.186	  	  
The	   Investigative	   Officer	   is	   charged	   with	   determining	   whether	  
probable	  cause	  exists,	  a	  prosecutorial	  task.	  However,	  the	  highest	  military	  
court	  has	  repeatedly	  held	  that	  “Article	  32	  investigation[s]	  [are]	  judicial	  in	  
nature.	   ”187	   	   Noting	   the	   potential	   for	   unconstitutional	   bias	   in	   civilian	  
administrative	  adjudication,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  correctly	  stated,	  “under	  a	  
realistic	   appraisal	   of	   psychological	   tendencies	   and	   human	   weakness,	  
conferring	  investigative	  and	  adjudicative	  powers	  on	  the	  same	  individuals	  
poses	  such	  a	  risk	  of	  actual	  bias	  or	  prejudgment	  that	  the	  practice	  must	  be	  
forbidden	   if	   the	   guarantee	   of	   due	   process	   is	   to	   be	   adequately	  
implemented.”188	  The	  Army’s	  highest	  court	  shared	  similar	  concerns	  when	  
“it	   found	   that	   it	   was	   error	   for	   the	   investigation	   officer	   to	   prevent	   the	  
defense	   counsel	   from	   fully	   cross-­‐examining	   one	   of	   the	   Government’s	  
                                                
184	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Grimm,	  6	  M.J.	  890,	  893	  (A.C.M.R.	  1979).	  
185	  See	  Id.	  	  
186	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Payne,	  3	  M.J.	  354,	  355	  n.	  4	  (C.M.A.	  1977).	  
187	  	  United	  States	  v.	  Davis,	  20	  M.J.	  61,	  65	  (C.M.A.	  1985)	  (“Furthermore,	  we	  do	  not	  
wish	  to	  establish	  a	  rule	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  line	  officers,	  rather	  
than	  military	  lawyers,	  as	  investigating	  officers.	  An	  Article	  32	  investigation	  is	  judicial	  
in	  nature.	  .	  .and	  use	  of	  legally	  trained	  persons	  to	  perform	  the	  judicial	  duties	  involved	  
avoids	  some	  of	  the	  complaints	  lodged	  against	  lay	  judges.”	  (citing	  United	  States	  v.	  
Payne,	  3	  M.J.	  354,	  355	  n.5	  (C.M.A.	  1977);	  United	  States	  v.	  Samuels,	  10	  U.S.C.M.A.	  
206,	  27	  C.M.R.	  280	  (1959);	  Payne,	  3	  M.J.	  at	  355	  note	  6)	  (internal	  quotations	  
omitted)).	  	  
188	  Withrow	  v.	  Larkin,	  421	  U.S.	  35,	  47	  (1975)	  (discussing	  the	  potential	  for	  
unconstitutional	  bias	  in	  civilian	  administrative	  adjudication)	  (internal	  citations	  and	  
quotations	  omitted).	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principal	  witnesses	  on	  a	  matter	  that	  affects	  the	  witness’	  credibility.”189	  In	  
arriving	   at	   their	   conclusion,	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   it	   did	   “not	   expect	   a	  
layman	   in	   the	   law	   to	   know	   the	   niceties	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   evidence.”190As	  
mentioned	  supra,	  the	  MCM	  states	  that	  “it	  would	  clearly	  be	  unreasonable	  
to	  suggest	  that	  Congress	  in	  protecting	  the	  victims	  of	  sexual	  offenses	  from	  
the	   degrading	   and	   irrelevant	   cross-­‐examination	   .	   .	   .	   typical	   of	   sexual	  
assault	  cases	  would	  have	  intended	  to	  permit	  the	  identical	  examination	  at	  
a	  military	  preliminary	  hearing	  that	  is	  not	  even	  presided	  over	  by	  a	  legally	  
trained	  individual.”191	  RCM	  405	  and	  MRE	  have	  a	  paradoxical	  relationship.	  	  
	  
iii. The	  “Availability”	  Issue	  
	  
The	  Article	  32	  amendments	   fall	   short	   in	  another	   important	  area.	  
The	  amendments	  added	  the	  right	  of	  military	  witnesses	  to	  lawfully	  refuse	  
to	   appear	   at	   a	   pretrial	   hearing,	   thus	   giving	  military	  witnesses	   the	   same	  
right	   civilian	   witnesses	   had	   prior	   to	   the	   NDAA	   2014.192	   Civilians	   have	  
never	  been	  legally	  obligated	  to	  appear	  or	  testify	  at	  Article	  32	  hearings.193	  
The	   Rules	   for	   Courts-­‐Martial	   state	   in	   relevant	   part:	   “If	   a	   witness	   is	   not	  
reasonably	  available	  the	  investigating	  officer	  may	  consider	  alternatives	  to	  
that	  witness's	  testimony.194	  A	  civilian	  witness	  who	  refuses	  to	  testify	  is	  not	  
reasonably	  available,	  because	  civilian	  witnesses	  may	  not	  be	  compelled	  to	  
attend	  a	  pretrial	   investigation.”195	  Therefore,	  even	  before	  NDAA	  2014,	  if	  
a	   key	   government	   civilian	   victim-­‐witnesses	   did	   not	   want	   to	   appear	   or	  
testify	  at	  an	  Article	  32	  hearing,	   they	  would	  be	  declared	  unavailable	  and	  
could	   not	   be	   compelled	   to	   appear.196	   However,	   just	   because	   a	   key	  
government	  witness	  is	  unavailable,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  accused	  
cannot	   request	   the	   military	   judge	   to	   subpoena	   the	   witness	   for	   a	  
                                                
189	  U.	  S.	  v.	  Harris,	  2	  M.J.	  1089,	  1090	  (A.C.M.R.	  1977)	  aff'd,	  5	  M.J.	  266	  (C.M.A.	  1978)	  
(emphasis	  added)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  
190	  Id.	  	  
191	  Manual	  for	  Courts-­‐Marital,	  supra	  note	  144,	  Analysis	  of	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  303,	  App.	  22,	  
at	  A2-­‐29.	  	  
192	  The	  amendment	  provides	  in	  relevant	  part:	  
“(3)	  A	  victim	  may	  not	  be	  required	  to	  testify	  at	  the	  preliminary	  hearing.	  A	  victim	  who	  
declines	  to	  testify	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  not	  available	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  
preliminary	  hearing.”	  10	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  832(d)(3)	  (2014)	  
193	  See	  R.C.M.	  405(g)(2)(B)	  (Discussion).	  
194	  See	  Id.	  
195	  	  See	  Id.	  
196	  See	  R.C.M.	  405(g)(2)(B)	  (Discussion).	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deposition.197	   The	   presence	   of	   a	   civilian	   witness	   may	   be	   obtained	   by	  
subpoena.198	   NDAA	   2014	   does	   nothing	   to	   cure	   the	   deposition	   loophole	  
regarding	  victim	  availability.199	  	  
A	   March	   2014	   Air	   Force	   Court	   of	   Criminal	   Appeals	   decision	  
illustrates	   this	   issue.	   In	  McDowell,	   the	   Government	   preferred	   a	   charge	  
and	  specification	  on	  August	  14,	  2013	  alleging	  rape	  against	  the	  accused.200	  	  
An	  Article	  32	  hearing	  was	  scheduled	  for	  September	  4,	  2013.201	  On	  August	  
27,	  2013,	   trial	  defense	  counsel	  contacted	  the	  mother	  of	  BB,	   the	  alleged	  
civilian	   victim,	   to	   arrange	   an	   interview	   with	   BB.202	   The	   interview	   took	  
place	  on	  September	  3,	  2013,	  the	  first	  mutually	  available	  day	  and	  one	  day	  
before	   the	  pretrial	  hearing.203	  After	   three	  hours	  of	  answering	  questions	  
from	   trial	   defense	   counsel,	   BB	   and	   her	   mother	   ended	   the	   interview,	  
noting	   that	   it	   was	   late	   and	   that	   BB	   had	   to	   meet	   with	   trial	   counsel	   to	  
prepare	  for	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  the	  next	  day.204	  At	  the	  pretrial	  hearing,	  
defense	  counsel	  noted	  they	  had	  not	  completed	  their	   interview	  of	  BB.205	  
The	  IO	  allowed	  defense	  counsel	  additional	  latitude	  on	  cross-­‐examination	  
because	   of	   the	   limited	   pre-­‐trial	   interview	   of	   BB.206	   BB	   completed	   her	  
testimony	   on	   direct,	   and	   cross-­‐examination	   began	   before	   the	   lunch	  
break.207	  During	  the	  lunch	  break,	  the	  IO	  observed	  that	  BB	  appeared	  upset	  
by	  the	  questions	  asked	  on	  cross-­‐examination.208	  The	  IO	  was	  unsure	  if	  BB	  
knew	  that	  she	  was	  not	  legally	  obligated	  to	  appear	  at	  the	  hearing.209	  The	  
IO	  informed	  counsel	  for	  both	  parties	  that	  he	  intended	  to	  inform	  BB	  that	  
she	  was	  not	  required	  to	  appear,	   in	  order	  to	  preclude	  any	  possible	  claim	  
                                                
197	  See	  R.C.M.	  702(a).	  	  
198 See	  R.C.M.	  703(g)(2). 
199	  The	  amended	  version	  of	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  832(d)(3),	  which	  will	  go	  into	  effect	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  2014	  says:	  “A	  victim	  may	  not	  be	  required	  to	  testify	  at	  the	  preliminary	  hearing.	  A	  
victim	  who	  declines	  to	  testify	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  not	  available	  for	  purposes	  of	  
the	  preliminary	  hearing.”	  
200	  United	  States	  v.	  McDowell,	  MC	  2013-­‐28,	  2014	  WL	  1323102,	  at	  *1	  (A.F.	  Ct.	  Crim.	  
App.	  Mar.	  13,	  2014).	  	  
201	  Id.	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that	  BB	  was	   forced	   to	   testify	  against	  her	  will.210	  Both	   sides	  agreed	  with	  
the	   IOs	   decision,	   and	   after	   the	   break,	   the	   IO	   informed	   BB,	   and	   cross-­‐
examination	  resumed.211	  	  
Defense	   counsel	   asked	   BB	   a	   number	   of	   probing	   questions	   on	  
issues	   not	   immediately	   related	   to	   the	   offense	   charged.212	   During	  
interrogatories	   posed	   by	   the	   military	   judge	   during	   pre-­‐trial	   motions	  
practice,	   the	   IO	   responded	   that	  many	  of	   the	  questions	  defense	   counsel	  
asked	   at	   first	   glance	   seemed	   irrelevant	   and	   intended	   to	   harass,	   but	  
justified	  the	  questions	  based	  on	  the	  defense’s	  lack	  of	  a	  complete	  pretrial	  
interview.213	   The	   IO	   raised	   relevancy	   objections,	   but	   defense	   counsel	  
insisted	   the	   questions	   were	   necessary	   and	   refused	   to	   move	   on	   to	  
questions	  relevant	  to	  the	  offense	  charged.214	  	  
Cross-­‐examination	  took	  place	  for	  more	  than	  two	  hours.215	  BB	  was	  
asked	   a	   number	   of	   questions	   about	   the	   type	   of	   shoes	   the	   accused	  
wore.216	  The	  IO	  did	  not	  know	  why	  defense	  counsel	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  
BB’s	   first	   response	   indicating	   she	  did	  not	   remember	   the	  accused’s	   shoe	  
type.217	   The	   IO	   believed	   defense	   counsel	   was	   “needling	   her	   for	   a	  
reaction.”218	  BB	  asked	  whether	  the	  type	  of	  shoes	  the	  accused	  wore	  was	  
relevant	  and	  asked	  permission	   to	   leave.219	  The	   IO	   informed	  BB	   she	  was	  
free	  to	  leave.220	  BB	  left	  before	  defense	  counsel	  questioned	  her	  about	  the	  
offense	   charged.221	   Defense	   counsel	   objected	   to	   the	   IO’s	   Article	   32	  
report.222	   The	   IO	   considered	   the	   objections	   and	   prepared	   a	  
recommendation	  that	  included	  BB’s	  testimony.223	  
	  During	   pre-­‐trial	   motions	   practice,	   defense	   counsel	   moved	   the	  
military	   judge	   to	   order	   a	   deposition	   of	   the	   victim,	   arguing	   that	   the	  
investigation	   was	   not	   sufficiently	   thorough	   and	   denied	   the	   accused	   a	  
                                                
210	  Id.	  at	  *2.	  	  
211	  Id.	  	  











223	  Id.	  at	  *3.	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substantial	  pretrial	  right	  by	  not	  being	  afforded	  a	  full	  opportunity	  to	  cross-­‐
examine	   the	   key	   witness-­‐victim,	   who	   was	   central	   to	   the	   government’s	  
case.224	   Defense	   counsel	   previously	   requested	   that	   the	   convening	  
authority	   order	   a	   deposition,	   but	   their	   request	   was	   denied.225	  
Additionally,	   defense	   counsel	   moved	   the	   military	   judge	   to	   dismiss	   the	  
charge	   and	   specification,	   or	   to	   direct	   a	   new	   Article	   32	   hearing.226	   The	  
government	   opposed	   both	  motions.227	   The	  military	   judge	   granted	   both	  
motions,	  ordering	  the	  reopening	  of	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  so	  the	  IO	  could	  
consider	   the	   victim’s	   testimony.228	   In	   granting	   the	   motion,	   the	   judge	  
concluded	   that	   although	   the	   victim	   would	   be	   available	   for	   trial,	   a	  
deposition	  was	  proper	  because	  the	  victim	  provided	  incomplete	  testimony	  
at	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing,	  which	  denied	  the	  accused	  a	  substantial	  pretrial	  
right	   to	   cross-­‐examine	   an	   available	   witness.229	   Sixteen	   days	   after	   the	  
motions	  were	  granted,	  the	  United	  States	  filed	  a	  Petition	  for	  Extraordinary	  
Relief230,	   seeking	   a	   writ	   of	   mandamus	   ordering	   the	   military	   judge	   to	  
reverse	  the	  order.231	  	  
On	   review,	   the	  Air	   Force	   Court	   of	   Criminal	   Appeals	   concluded	   it	  
was	   proper	   to	   consider	   the	   petition	   under	   the	   All	   Writs	   Act232	   but	  







230	  Id.	  (“The	  All	  Writs	  Act,	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1651(a),	  authorizes	  all	  courts	  established	  by	  Act	  
of	  Congress	  [to]	  issue	  all	  writs	  necessary	  or	  appropriate	  in	  aid	  of	  their	  respective	  
jurisdictions	  and	  agreeable	  to	  the	  usages	  and	  principles	  of	  law.	  This	  Court	  is	  among	  
the	  courts	  authorized	  under	  the	  All	  Writs	  Act	  to	  issue	  all	  writs	  necessary	  or	  
appropriate	  in	  aid	  of	  their	  respective	  jurisdictions.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  held	  that	  
three	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  before	  a	  court	  may	  provide	  extraordinary	  relief	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  writ	  of	  mandamus:	  (1)	  the	  party	  seeking	  the	  writ	  must	  have	  no	  other	  
adequate	  means	  to	  attain	  the	  relief;	  (2)	  the	  party	  seeking	  the	  relief	  must	  show	  that	  
the	  right	  to	  issuance	  of	  the	  relief	  is	  clear	  and	  indisputable;	  and	  (3)	  even	  if	  the	  first	  
two	  prerequisites	  have	  been	  met,	  the	  issuing	  court,	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  its	  discretion,	  
must	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  writ	  is	  appropriate	  under	  the	  circumstances.”	  (internal	  
citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted)).	  	  
231	  Id.	  	  
232	  Id.	  at	  *4	  (“To	  justify	  reversal	  of	  a	  discretionary	  decision	  by	  mandamus,	  we	  must	  
be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  decision	  amounted	  ‘to	  a	  judicial	  usurpation	  of	  power	  or	  be	  
characteristic	  of	  an	  erroneous	  practice	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  recur.	  A	  decision	  by	  a	  trial	  
judge	  may	  be	  erroneous	  but	  not	  rise	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  usurpation	  of	  judicial	  power,	  so	  
long	  as	  the	  trial	  judge's	  ruling	  is	  “made	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  court's	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nevertheless	   denied	   the	   government’s	   petition.233	   The	   appellate	   court	  
discussed	  Article	  32	  proceedings,	  stating:	  	  
	  
A	   formal	   pretrial	   investigation	   is	   a	   predicate	   to	   the	   referral	   of	  
charges	   to	  a	  general	   court-­‐martial	  unless	   the	  accused	  waives	   the	  
pretrial	   proceeding.	   The	   procedures	   for	   an	   Article	   32	   hearing	  
include	   representation	   of	   the	   accused	   by	   counsel,	   the	   right	   to	  
present	   evidence,	   and	   the	   right	   to	   call	   and	   cross-­‐examine	  
witnesses.	   The	   Article	   32	   investigation	   operates	   as	   a	   discovery	  
proceeding	   for	   the	   accused	   and	   stands	   as	   a	   bulwark	   against	  
baseless	   charges.	  However,	   the	   accused	  has	   no	   absolute	   right	   to	  
examine	   or	   cross-­‐examine	   all	   relevant	   witnesses	   at	   this	  
proceeding.	   If	   a	   witness	   is	   not	   reasonably	   available	   the	  
investigating	   officer	   may	   consider	   alternatives	   to	   that	   witness's	  
testimony.	   A	   civilian	   witness	   who	   refuses	   to	   testify	   is	   not	  
reasonably	   available,	   because	   civilian	   witnesses	   may	   not	   be	  
compelled	  to	  attend	  a	  pretrial	  investigation.234	  	  
	  
Regarding	  depositions,	  the	  appellate	  court	  stated:	  	  
	  
A	  deposition	  may	  be	  ordered	  whenever,	  after	  preferral	  of	  charges,	  
due	  to	  exceptional	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  
justice	   that	   the	   testimony	  of	   a	   prospective	  witness	  be	   taken	  and	  
preserved	   for	  use	  at	  an	   investigation	  under	  Article	  32	  or	  a	  court-­‐
martial.	  A	  deposition	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  preserve	  the	  testimony	  of	  a	  
witness	   who	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   unavailable	   at	   the	   Article	   32	  
investigation	   or	   at	   trial.	   After	   referral,	   either	   the	   convening	  
authority	   or	   the	   military	   judge	   may	   order	   that	   a	   deposition	   be	  
taken	   on	   request	   of	   a	   party.	   A	   request	   for	   a	   deposition	  may	   be	  
denied	  only	  for	  good	  cause.	  Good	  cause	  for	  denial	  includes	  failure	  
to	   state	   a	  proper	   ground	   for	   taking	   a	  deposition,	   failure	   to	   show	  
the	   probable	   relevance	   of	   the	   witness's	   testimony,	   or	   that	   the	  
witness's	   testimony	   would	   be	   unnecessary.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  
witness	   is	  or	  will	   be	  available	   for	   trial	   is	   good	  cause	   for	  denial	   in	  
the	  absence	  of	  unusual	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  improper	  denial	  of	  
a	   witness	   request	   at	   an	   Article	   32	   hearing,	   unavailability	   of	   an	  
essential	   witness	   at	   an	   Article	   32	   hearing,	   or	   when	   the	  
Government	   has	   improperly	   impeded	   defense	   access	   to	   a	  
                                                                                                                
jurisdiction	  to	  decide	  issues	  properly	  brought	  before	  it.	  Congress	  must	  have	  realized	  
that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  judicial	  decision	  some	  interlocutory	  orders	  might	  be	  erroneous,	  
and	  therefore	  limited	  application	  of	  the	  All	  Writs	  Act	  for	  writs	  of	  mandamus	  to	  the	  
exceptional	  case	  where	  there	  is	  clear	  abuse	  of	  discretion	  or	  usurpation	  of	  judicial	  
power.”	  (internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted)).	  
233	  Id.	  	  
234	  Id.	  (internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted).	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witness.235	  	  
	  
Consequentially,	   the	  appellate	   court	  held	   that	   the	  military	   judge	  
decided	  an	  issue	  the	  parties	  properly	  placed	  before	  him,	  and	  he	  elected	  a	  
lawful	   option	   in	   response	   to	   the	   motions.236	   Therefore,	   there	   was	   no	  
judicial	  usurpation	  of	  power	  in	  either	  of	  the	  trial	  court’s	  rulings.237	  Based	  
on	   the	   Discussion	   to	   RCM	   702(c)(2)(A),	   which	   indicates	   that	   ordering	   a	  
deposition	   may	   be	   proper	   if	   an	   essential	   witness	   is	   unavailable	   at	   an	  
Article	   32	   hearing,	   the	   appellate	   court	   agreed	   that	   a	   “reasonable	  
argument	   could	   be	   made	   that	   an	   essential	   witness—BB—was	   made	  
unavailable	   at	   the	   Article	   32	   hearing	   when	   she	   excused	   herself	   before	  
cross-­‐examination	  concluded.”238	  While	  “BB	  was	  not	  required	  to	  appear	  
at	  the	  Article	  32	  hearing	  at	  all,	  the	  highest	  military	  court	  has	  held	  that	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  key	  civilian	  witness	  can	  ‘deprive	  the	  accused	  of	  a	  substantial	  
pretrial	   right,’	   and	   that	   the	  mere	   refusal	  of	  a	   civilian	   to	   testify	  do	  at	  an	  
Article	   32	   hearing	   ‘does	   not	   eo	   ipso	   nullify	   the	   defense	   right	   to	   cross-­‐
examine.’”239	  The	  highest	  military	  court	  held	  that	  where	  the	  defense	  did	  
not	   file	   a	   timely	  motion	   to	   depose	   the	   absent	   civilian	  witness,	   and	   the	  
absence	  of	   the	   civilian	  witness	   at	   the	  pretrial	   hearing	  did	  not	   adversely	  
affect	   the	   trial,	   there	   was	   no	   reason	   to	   set	   aside	   the	   conviction.240	  
However,	   in	   the	   instant	   case,	   defense	   counsel	   timely	   filed	   a	  motion	   to	  
depose	  a	  key	  civilian	  witness.241	  	  
“Assuming	  without	  deciding	  that	  [BB’s]	  departure	  after	  more	  than	  
two	   hours	   of	   cross-­‐examination	   constituted	   her	   ‘unavailability’	   that	  
‘deprived	  the	  accused	  of	  a	  substantial	  pretrial	  right,’	  [binding	  precedent]	  
indicates	   that	   ordering	   [BB’s]	   deposition	   was	   an	   authorized	   course	   of	  
action.”242	   Despite	   affirming	   the	   trial	   court’s	   course	   of	   action,	   the	  
appellate	   court	   viewed	   the	   trial	   court’s	   ruling	   with	   caution.243	   Here,	  
defense	  counsel	  “had	  the	  benefit	  of	  more	  than	  five	  hours	  with	  BB:	  three	  
hours	   during	   the	   defense	   interview	   and	  more	   than	   two	  hours	   of	   cross-­‐
                                                
235	  Id.	  (internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted).	  	  
236	  Id.	  at	  *5.	  	  
237	  Id.	  
238	  Id.	  
239	  Id.	  (quoting	  United	  States	  v.	  Chuculate,	  5	  M.J.	  143,	  144–46	  (C.M.A.	  1978)).	  	  
240	  Id.	  (citing	  Chuculate,	  5	  M.J.	  at	  144-­‐46).	  	  
241	  Id.	  	  
242	  Id.	  (quoting	  Chuculate,	  5	  M.J.	  at	  144-­‐46).	  
243	  Id.	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examination	  during	   the	  Article	  32	  hearing.”244	   If	  defense	  counsel	  “could	  
not	   cover	   this	   relatively	   straight-­‐forward	   accusation	   during	   that	   time,	  
then	   perhaps	   defense	   counsel	   should	   not	   be	   entitled	   to	   another	  
unlimited	  block	  of	  time	  in	  which	  to	  question	  BB	  during	  a	  deposition.”245	  
The	   court	   cautioned	   trial	   judges	  and	   IOs	   to	  ensure	   that	   their	   rulings	  do	  
not	  generate	  an	   incentive	  for	  defense	  counsel	   to	  create	  a	  situation	  that	  
renders	  a	  witness	  unavailable	  at	  an	  Article	  32	  hearing.246	  BB	  was	  available	  
to	  testify	  at	  trial.247	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  appellate	  court	  stated:	  “We	  know	  of	  no	  other	  
instance	  in	  which	  a	  military	  judge	  has	  ordered	  a	  deposition	  under	  similar	  
facts	   such	   as	   the	   instant	   case,	   and	   the	   parties	   and	   amicus	   briefs	   have	  
pointed	  us	  to	  none.”248	  Furthermore,	  because	  the	  Article	  32	  process	  will	  
soon	   be	   more	   limited	   in	   scope,	   with	   “explicit	   statutory	   language”	  
requiring	  that	  “[a]	  victim	  may	  not	  be	  required	  to	  testify	  at	  the	  preliminary	  
hearing	  .	  .	  .	  .	  [d]efense	  counsel	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  greater	  occasion	  to	  
request	   depositions	   of	   alleged	   victims	   after	   this	   legislation249	   takes	  
effect….”250	  
The	   McDowell	   court’s	   decision	   was	   based	   on	   earlier	   binding	  
precedent.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Jackson251,	   the	   highest	  military	   court	   found	  
that	   the	   accused	   was	   denied	   a	   substantial	   pretrial	   right,	   requiring	  
reversal,	  where	  the	  accused	  was	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  cross-­‐examine	  a	  key	  
government	  witness	  prior	  to	  trial	  and	  the	  trial	  court	  denied	  defendant’s	  
motion	   for	   further	   proceedings	   under	   Article	   32.252	   Thus,	   whether	   a	  
deposition	  will	  be	  granted	  or	  not	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	   initially	   unavailable	  witness’s	   testimony.	   Submitting	   to	   a	   deposition	  
would	  not	  be	  that	  big	  of	  an	  issue	  if	  the	  person	  overseeing	  the	  deposition	  
was	   required	   to	   possess	   legal	   training.	   However,	   the	   RCM	   does	   not	  
require	  a	  deposition	  officer	  to	  be	  legally	  trained.	  Additionally,	  unlike	  in	  an	  
Article	  32	  hearing,	  where	   the	   IO	  may	  rule	  on	  objections,	   the	  deposition	  
                                                
244	  Id.	  	   	  
245	  Id.	  	   	  
246	  Id.	  	   	  
247	  Id.	  	   	  
248	  Id.	  at	  *6.	  	  
249	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1702,	  127	  Stat	  672.	  
250	  Id.	  	  
251	  United	  States	  v.	  Jackson,	  3	  M.J.	  597	  (N.C.M.R.	  1977)	  aff'd,	  3	  M.J.	  206	  (C.M.A.	  
1977).	  
252	  See	  Id.	  at	  599.	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officer	   shall	   “record,	   but	   not	   rule	   upon,	   objections	   or	  motions	   and	   the	  
testimony	  to	  which	  they	  relate.	  .	  .	  .”	  253	  	  
“When	   any	   unusual	   problems,	   such	   as	   improper	   conduct	   by	  
counsel	   or	   a	   witness,	   prevents	   an	   orderly	   and	   fair	   proceeding,	   the	  
deposition	   officer	   should	   adjourn	   the	   proceedings	   and	   inform	   the	  
[CA].”254	  Regarding	  deposition	  testimony:	  “Part	  or	  all	  of	  a	  deposition,	  so	  
far	  as	  otherwise	  admissible	  under	  the	  [MRE],	  may	  be	  used	  on	  the	  merits	  
or	  on	  an	  interlocutory	  question	  as	  substantive	  evidence	  if	  the	  witness	   is	  
unavailable.	   .	   .	   .”255	   Additionally,	   the	   deposition	   officer	   is	   charged	  with	  
“maintain[ing]	   order	   during	   the	   deposition	   and	   protect[ing]	   the	   parties	  
and	  witnesses	   from	   annoyance,	   embarrassment,	   or	   oppression.”256	   The	  
deposition	   officer	   decides	   whether	   to	   adjourn	   the	   proceedings	   and	  
inform	  the	  convening	  authority.257	  	  
MRE	   1101	   applies	   MRE	   412	   to	   Article	   32	   hearings.258	   However,	  
MRE	   1101	   does	   not	   apply	  MRE	   412	   to	   depositions,	   but	   RCM	   702	   says	  
deposition	   testimony	   can	   be	   used	   on	   the	   merits	   and	   as	   substantive	  
evidence	  if	  the	  witness	  is	  unavailable.259	  In	  the	  civilian	  legal	  system,	  “[a]t	  
any	   time	   during	   a	   deposition,	   the	   deponent	   or	   a	   party	   may	   move	   to	  
terminate	  or	  limit	  it	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  is	  being	  conducted	  in	  bad	  faith	  
or	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  unreasonably	  annoys,	  embarrasses,	  or	  oppresses	  the	  
deponent	  or	  party.”	  260	  However,	  in	  the	  military,	  a	  party	  cannot	  move	  to	  
terminate	   the	  deposition.	  Only	   the	  deposition	  officer	   can	   terminate	   the	  
deposition.	  Considering	  deposition	  officer’s	  responsibilities	  are	  “primarily	  
ministerial	   in	  nature”261, the	  RCM	  gives	  a	  deposition	  officer	  a	  significant	  
                                                
253	  R.C.M.	  702(f)(7).	  	  
254	  R.C.M.	  702(f)	  (Discussion).	  	  
255	  R.C.M.	  702(a)	  (Discussion).	  
256	  R.C.M.	  702(f)(3).	  	  
257	  See	  R.C.M.	  702(f)	  (Discussion)	  (“When	  any	  unusual	  problem,	  such	  as	  improper	  
conduct	  by	  counsel	  or	  witness,	  prevents	  an	  orderly	  and	  fair	  proceeding,	  the	  
deposition	  officer	  should	  adjourn	  the	  proceedings	  and	  inform	  the	  convening	  
authority.”)	  
258	  Mil.	  R.	  EvId.	  1101(d).	  	  
259	  R.C.M.	  702(a)	  (Discussion).	  
260	  Fed.	  R.	  Civ.	  P.	  30;	  See	  also	  Fed.	  R.	  Civ.	  P.	  30(d)	  (B)	  (“The	  court	  may	  order	  that	  the	  
deposition	  be	  terminated	  or	  may	  limit	  its	  scope	  and	  manner	  as	  provided	  in	  Rule	  
26(c).	  If	  terminated,	  the	  deposition	  may	  be	  resumed	  only	  by	  order	  of	  the	  court	  
where	  the	  action	  is	  pending.”)	  
261	  United	  States	  v.	  Hughes,	  ACM	  37958	  (F	  REV),	  2013	  WL	  4734857,	  at	  *5	  (A.F.	  Ct.	  
Crim.	  App.	  Aug.	  28,	  2013)	  review	  denied,	  14-­‐0144/AF,	  2014	  WL	  1345428	  (C.A.A.F.	  
Mar.	  6,	  2014)	  (“R.C.M.	  702(f)	  outlines	  the	  duties	  of	  a	  deposition	  officer.	  Our	  superior	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amount	   of	   discretion	   resulting	   in	   the	   potential	   for	   victim	   abuse.	   Both	  
parties	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	  move	   the	  military	   judge	   to	   terminate	   the	  
deposition.	   At	   least	   in	   the	   civilian	   system,	   the	   military	   judge	   is	   in	   a	  
separate	   branch	   of	   the	   government,	   free	   from	   the	   appearance	   of	   and	  
potential	   actual	   biases	   involved.	   In	   the	   military,	   the	   CA,	   IO,	   and	  
deposition	   officer	   are	   all	   members	   of	   the	   same	   executive	   branch.	  
Furthermore,	  in	  the	  military,	  the	  RCM	  do	  not	  explain	  what	  happens	  after	  
the	  deposition	  officer	  decides	  to	  inform	  the	  CA	  because	  according	  to	  the	  
deposition	  officer,	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  deposition	  is	  out	  of	  control.	  Can	  the	  
CA	  terminate	  the	  deposition?	  Does	  the	  CA	  just	  tell	  the	  deposition	  officer	  
to	  take	  a	  break	  and	  continue?	  	  
A	   legally	   trained	   officer	   should	   be	   required	   for	   depositions	  
because,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  at	  trial,	  
MRE	   412	   is	   also	   intended	   to	   protect	   the	   victim	   from	   degrading	   and	  
embarrassing	   cross-­‐examination.	   Even	   if	   a	   deposition	   officer	   were	  
forbidden	   from	   ruling	   on	   objections,	   at	   least	   a	   legally	   trained	   officer	  
would	  have	  a	  better	  idea	  of	  when	  the	  MRE	  412	  line	  is	  crossed.	  MRE	  412’s	  
application	  is	  explained	  in	  the	  MRE	  and	  in	  case	  law.	  However,	  the	  RCM,	  
do	   not	   provide	   guidance	   on	   how	   to	   handle	   a	   situation	   where	   cross-­‐
examination	  becomes	  so	  abusive	  as	  to	  warrant	  the	  deposition	  officer	  to	  
use	   his	   powers	   to	   control	   conduct	   as	   a	   means	   to	   stop	   the	   cross-­‐
examination.	   The	   deposition	   officer’s	   conduct	   determination	   is	   too	  
subjective	   to	   afford	   any	   meaningful	   protections	   to	   an	   alleged	   victim.	  
Questions	   that	   a	   legally	   trained	   officer	   would	   properly	   exclude	   under	  
MRE	   412	   might	   be	   allowed	   under	   a	   deposition	   officer’s	   conduct	  
determination	  if	  that	  officer	  did	  not	  subjectively	  think	  that	  a	  specific	  line	  
of	  questioning	  passed	  into	  his	  bad	  conduct	  threshold.	  	  
The	   benefit	   of	   allowing	   witnesses	   the	   option	   of	   appearing	   at	  
Article	  32	  hearings	  is	  undermined	  in	  the	  event	  the	  accused	  timely	  objects	  
to	  not	  having	  an	  opportunity	  to	  cross-­‐examine	  a	  key	  witness	  before	  trial.	  
If	   the	   accused	   object	   before	   trial	   starts,	   the	   victim	   will	   be	   required	   to	  
appear	   at	   a	   deposition	   potentially	   overseen	   by	   a	   non-­‐legally	   trained	  
deposition	   officer.	   Thus,	   victims	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   legal	  
incompetence	  and	  unfairness	  that	  precipitated	  reforms	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  
                                                                                                                
court	  has	  stated	  such	  responsibilities	  are	  primarily	  ministerial	  in	  nature….	  As	  a	  
deposition	  officer,	  [the]	  [deposition]	  [officer]	  would	  not	  have	  been	  called	  upon	  to	  
ask	  her	  own	  questions	  or	  make	  conclusions	  of	  law	  or	  findings	  of	  fact.”(internal	  
citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted)).	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only	  the	  venue	  has	  changed.	  	  
The	  victim-­‐witness	  is	  left	  with	  a	  Hobson’s	  choice.	  One	  option	  is	  for	  
the	  victim	  to	  choose	  to	  testify	  at	  an	  Article	  32	  hearing,	  where	  hopefully	  
the	  use	  of	  a	  JAG	  is	  “practicable”	  and	  MRE	  412’s	  procedural	  requirements	  
are	   enforced	   completely.	   However,	   because	   the	   hearing	   is	   public,	   and	  
MRE	   412’s	   procedures	   are	   not	   adequately	   enforced,	   ostracism	   and	  
retaliation	   from	  peers	  who	  either	   attended	   the	  hearing	  or	   heard	   about	  
the	   victim’s	   testimony	   are	   likely.262	   The	   other	   choice	   is	   a	   deposition,	  
where	   the	   accused	   will	   have	   the	   right	   to	   cross-­‐examine	   the	   witness	  
without	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   legally	   trained	   judicial	   officer	   to	   rule	   on	  
objections	   and	   with	   either	   all	   or	   part	   of	   the	   deposition	   testimony	  
considered	  on	  the	  merits	  in	  pretrial	  proceedings	  by	  the	  IO.263	  	  
The	  addition	  of	  SVCs	  for	  sexual	  assault	  victims	  will	  benefit	  victims	  
by	   providing	   victims	   with	   an	   attorney	   who	   will	   advocate	   for	   them	  
exclusively264.	  However,	  because	  IOs	  are	  neither	  required,	  nor	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   deposition	   officers,	   qualified,	   to	   rule	   on	   evidentiary	   objections	   at	  
pretrial	  proceedings265,	  in	  the	  event	  an	  SVC	  attempts	  to	  invoke	  MRE	  412	  
protections,	   the	   remedy	   to	   the	   victim	   in	   a	   pretrial	   setting	   is	   unclear.	  	  
Regardless,	  for	  victims,	  the	  benefit	  of	  SVCs	  will	  be	  seen	  at	  trial.	  	  
While	   there	   are	   definitely	   some	   legal	   procedures	   in	   the	  military	  
that	   justify	   a	   deviation	   from	   civilian	   procedures,	   criminal	   justice	  
proceedings	  should	  not	  be	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  need	  for	  reform	  has	  never	  
been	   more	   important,	   especially	   because	   victims	   are	   taking	   their	  
grievances	   to	   federal	   civilian	   courts,	   only	   to	   be	   denied	   justice.266	   Both	  
                                                
262	  Common	  reasons	  for	  victim’s	  not	  reporting	  include:	  (1)	  the	  belief	  that	  nothing	  
would	  be	  done;	  (2)	  fear	  of	  ostracism,	  harassment,	  or	  ridicule	  by	  peers;	  and	  (3)	  the	  
belief	  that	  their	  peers	  would	  gossip	  about	  the	  incident.	  See	  AZ	  v.	  Shinseki,	  731	  F.3d	  
1303,	  1312-­‐14	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)	  (citing	  Gov't	  Accountability	  Office,	  GAO–08–
1013T,	  Military	  Personnel:	  Preliminary	  Observations	  on	  DoD's	  and	  the	  Coast	  Guard's	  
Sexual	  Assault	  Prevention	  and	  Response	  Programs	  14	  (2008)).	  
263	  R.C.M.	  702(a)	  (Discussion).	  	  
264	  10	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  1044e	  (2014)	  
265	  See	  R.C.M.	  405(e)	  (Discussion);	  R.C.M.	  	  405(h)(2)	  (Discussion);	  R.C.M.	  702(f)(7);	  
R.C.M.	  702(h).	  	  
266	  See	  Cioca	  v.	  Rumsfeld,	  720	  F.3d	  505,	  513-­‐515	  (4th	  Cir.	  2013)	  (holding	  that	  service	  
members'	  allegations	  that	  former	  Secretaries	  of	  Defense,	  through	  their	  acts	  and	  
omissions	  in	  their	  official	  capacities,	  contributed	  to	  a	  military	  culture	  of	  tolerance	  for	  
sexual	  crimes	  were	  either	  incident	  to,	  or	  arose	  out	  of,	  their	  military	  service,	  and,	  
thus,	  no	  federal	  Bivens	  remedy	  was	  available	  for	  their	  injuries;	  allegations,	  including	  
that	  Secretaries	  failed	  to	  appoint	  any	  members	  to	  a	  commission	  to	  investigate	  
policies	  and	  procedures	  with	  respect	  to	  reports	  of	  sexual	  misconduct	  and	  that	  they	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legal	   systems	  encounter	   victims	  who	  are	   afraid	   to	   speak	  up	  because	  of	  
fear	   of	   retaliation	   and	   embarrassment.	   The	   psychological	   trauma	   and	  
social	   consequences	   that	   haunt	   a	   victim	   of	   sexual	   assault	   do	   not	   differ	  
because	  they	  happened	  on	  a	  military	  base	  or	  at	  a	  college	  fraternity	  party.	  	  	  
The	   procedural	   requirements	   of	   MRE	   412	   must	   be	   completely	  
enforced.	   The	   ability	   of	   defense	   counsel	   to	   cross-­‐examine	  witnesses	   in	  
any	   circumstance	   where	   a	   JAG	   is	   not	   present	   must	   be	   eliminated.	  
Additionally,	   an	   independent	   legally	   trained	   officer	   should	   make	  
evidentiary	  rulings	  in	  both	  depositions	  and	  Article	  32	  hearings	  to	  ensure	  
that	  MRE	  412	  fulfills	  its	  intended	  purpose	  as	  a	  rape	  shield.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  
defense	   is	   afforded	   a	   meaningful	   and	   thorough	   opportunity	   to	   cross-­‐
examine	  witnesses	  at	  trial,	  due	  process	  will	  not	  be	  offended.	  Grand	  juries	  
do	   not	   permit	   the	   defendant	   to	   cross-­‐examine	   witnesses,	   let	   alone	   be	  
present	   at	   the	   grand	   jury	   proceeding,	   and	   I	   see	   no	   reason	   other	   than	  




                                                                                                                
permitted	  command	  to	  use	  non-­‐judicial	  punishment	  for	  sexual	  crimes,	  directly	  
challenged	  wisdom	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  military	  and	  disciplinary	  decisions	  made	  
within	  ultimate	  chain	  of	  command.);	  see	  Klay	  v.	  Panetta,	  924	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  8,	  20	  
(D.D.C.	  2013)	  (“[T]he	  Court	  finds	  that	  a	  Bivens	  remedy	  is	  unavailable	  to	  plaintiffs	  
both	  because	  their	  injuries	  arose	  from,	  or	  were	  suffered	  in	  the	  course	  of	  activity	  
incident	  to,	  their	  military	  service,	  and	  because	  their	  particular	  claims	  raise	  the	  very	  
public	  policy	  considerations	  underlying	  the	  abstention	  doctrine.	  This	  decision	  is	  not	  
meant	  to	  question	  in	  any	  way	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  alleged	  sexual	  assaults	  and	  
retaliation,	  to	  minimize	  plaintiffs'	  suffering,	  or	  to	  express	  any	  doubts	  about	  the	  
allegations	  that	  the	  culture	  and	  management	  of	  the	  military	  has	  allowed	  this	  kind	  of	  
harassment	  and	  retaliation	  to	  persist.	  All	  parties	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  no	  question	  that	  
allegations	  of	  rape	  and	  sexual	  assault	  by	  service-­‐members	  should	  be	  investigated	  
and,	  if	  appropriate,	  prosecuted,	  and	  that	  victims	  of	  any	  such	  assaults	  should	  be	  
treated	  with	  care	  and	  compassion,	  and	  receive	  the	  full	  range	  of	  available	  support	  
services	  and	  medical	  treatment	  to	  address	  their	  needs….	  But	  the	  fact	  remains,	  as	  
plaintiffs	  recognized	  in	  open	  court,	  that	  the	  constitution	  vests	  the	  ultimate	  power	  to	  
decide	  how	  the	  military	  should	  run	  itself	  in	  Congress.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  deeply	  
troubling	  nature	  of	  the	  allegations	  in	  plaintiffs'	  complaint,	  the	  Court	  is	  not	  free	  to	  
infer	  a	  Bivens	  remedy	  under	  these	  circumstances.	  The	  special	  status	  of	  the	  military	  
has	  required,	  the	  Constitution	  contemplated,	  Congress	  has	  created,	  and	  this	  Court	  
has	  long	  recognized	  two	  systems	  of	  justice,	  to	  some	  extent	  parallel:	  one	  for	  civilians	  
and	  one	  for	  military	  personnel….”(internal	  citations	  and	  quotations	  omitted)).	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III.	  	  MJIA	  	  AND	  THE	  NDAA	  OF	  2014	  	  
	  
A. United	   States	   Senator	   Kirsten	   Gillibrand’s	   (D-­‐NY)	   Reform	  
Proposal	  
	  
In	   an	   article	   written	   by	   U.S.	   Senator	   Kirsten	   Gillibrand	   outlining	  
her	   proposed	   reforms	   to	   the	   military	   justice	   system,	   she	   begins	   with,	  
“[t]o	   find	   a	   common-­‐sense	   solution,	   [one]	   just	   [has]	   to	   listen	   to	   the	  
victim’s	   stories.”267	  Gillibrand	   then	  describes	   the	   story	  of	  Air	   Force	  First	  
Lieutenant	   Adam	   Cohen,	   who	   after	   telling	   his	   superiors	   that	   he	   was	  
sexually	   assaulted	   and	   threatened,	   became	   the	   target	   of	   a	   criminal	  
investigation.268	  “In	  April	  of	  2013,	  he	  was	  told	  by	  his	  commander,	  ‘I	  don’t	  
believe	   you	   were	   raped.”269	   After	   Cohen	   described	   the	   attack,	   he	   was	  
then	   told,	   	   “[t]hat’s	   good	  acting,	   but	   I	   still	   don’t	   believe	   you.”270	   Cohen	  
was	  then	  denied	  an	  expedited	  transfer	  request.271	  Gillibrand	  included	  this	  
victim’s	  account	  as	  just	  one	  example	  of	  what	  commanders	  say	  directly	  to	  
victims	  that	  are	  brave	  enough	  to	  come	  forward.	  272	  
In	   Gillibrand’s	   proposed	   Military	   Justice	   Improvement	   Act	  
(“MJIA”)273,	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  whether	  serious	  crimes	  go	  to	  trial	  
moves	   “from	   the	   chain	   of	   command	   to	   professionally	   trained	   military	  
prosecutors,	  where	  it	  belongs.”274	  Gillibrand	  points	  out	  that	  critics	  of	  the	  
MJIA	   say	   that	   moving	   decision	   making	   will	   diminish	   good	   order,	  
discipline,	  and	  unit	  cohesion.275	  However,	  Gillibrand	  counters	  by	  arguing	  
that	   “America’s	   closest	   allies	   like	   the	   U.K.,	   Canada,	   and	   Israel	   have	  
already	  adopted	  this	  approach	  without	  reported	  negative	  consequences	  
to	   the	   ‘good	   order	   and	   discipline’	   our	   military	   leaders	   are	   trying,	   but	  
failing,	  to	  uphold.”276	  	  
                                                
267	  Kirsten	  Gillibrand,	  Justice	  Equal	  to	  Their	  Sacrifices:	  Military	  Leadership	  Can’t	  
Ensure	  Justice	  For	  Sexual	  Assault	  Victims.	  U.S.	  NEWS	  &	  WORLD	  REPORT	  (July	  5,	  2013),	  
available	  at	  	  http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/07/05/military-­‐
leadership-­‐cant-­‐solve-­‐the-­‐problem-­‐of-­‐sexual-­‐assault.	  
268	  See	  Id.	  
269	  See	  Id.	  
270	  See	  Id.	  
271	  See	  Id.	  
272	  See	  Id.	  
273	  Military	  Justice	  Improvement	  Act,	  S.	  967,	  113TH	  Cong.	  (2013).	  	  
274	  See	  Gillibrand,	  supra	  note	  267.	  
275	  See	  Id.	  
276	  See	  Id.	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The	  MJIA	  also	   leaves	  many	  crimes	  within	  the	  chain	  of	  command,	  
including	  thirty-­‐six	  crimes	  unique	  to	  the	  military,	  such	  as	  insubordination	  
and	   other	   crimes	   punishable	   by	   less	   than	   one	   year	   of	   confinement.277	  
Additionally,	   the	   Act	   provides	   the	   offices	   of	   the	  military	   chiefs	   of	   staff	  
with	  the	  authority	  and	  discretion	  to	  establish	  courts,	  empanel	  juries,	  and	  
choose	   judges	   to	   hear	   cases	   (i.e.	   convening	   authorities).278	   The	   MJIA	  
would	  not	  amend	  Article	  15,279	  which	  deals	  with	  a	  commanding	  officer’s	  
non-­‐judicial	   punishment	   option.280	   Commanding	   officers	   would	   still	   be	  
able	  to	  order	  non-­‐judicial	  punishment	  for	  lesser	  offenses	  not	  directed	  to	  
trial	  by	  the	  prosecutors.281	  	  
“Despite	   ongoing	   advances	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   military	   medicine,	  
technology,	  weaponry,	  and	  tactics,	  U.S.	  military	  justice	  remains	  rooted	  in	  
an	   obsolete,	   eighteenth	   century	   system.282	   Commanders,	   rather	   than	  
highly	   trained	  military	   legal	   personnel,	   are	   vested	  with	   the	  authority	   to	  
administer	   justice.”283	   Prior	   to	   the	   enactment	   NDAA	   of	   2014,284	   the	  
convening	   authority	   had	   the	   ability	   to	   make	   charging	   decisions,	   select	  
jury	   members,	   and	   modify	   or	   overturn	   court	   decisions.285	   Because	   the	  
commander	  making	  these	  important	  decisions	  is	  in	  the	  accused’s	  chain	  of	  
command,	   military	   justice	   is	   unfairly	   biased,	   compromising	   both	   the	  
accused’s	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  and	  impartial	  trial	  as	  well	  as	  the	  alleged	  victim’s	  
access	  to	  meaningful	  justice.286	  
The	  MJIA	  still	  equips	  commanders	  with	   the	   tools	   to	  prevent	  and	  
respond	  to	  sexual	  assault	  by	  empowering	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  create	  and	  
maintain	   the	   climate	   within	   their	   respective	   units.287	   If	   a	   military	  
prosecutor	   decided	   not	   to	   try	   a	   case,	   a	   commander	   could	   still	   impose	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  See	  Id.	  	  
278	  Comprehensive	  Resource	  Center	  for	  the	  Military	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other	  forms	  of	  military	  discipline,	   including	  non-­‐judicial	  punishment	  and	  
administrative	   separation.288	   Contrary	   to	   the	   critics’	   contentions,	   good	  
order	  and	  discipline	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  just	  one	  person.289	  The	  convening	  
authority	  itself	  does	  not	  determine	  good	  order	  and	  discipline	  in	  a	  unit.290	  
Most	   leaders	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  good	  order	  and	  discipline	  (i.e.,	  
Non-­‐Commissioned	  Officers,	  Staff	  Non-­‐Commissioned	  Officers,	  and	  junior	  
officers)	  do	  not	  even	  have	  convening	  authority.291	  
	  
B. The	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  of	  2014292	  
	  
The	   NDAA	   of	   2014,	   signed	   into	   law	   by	   President	   Obama	   on	  
December	   26,	   2013,293	   fell	   short	   of	   enacting	  Gillibrand’s	   transformative	  
“taking	   the	   decision	   out	   of	   the	   chain	   of	   command”	   proposal,	   but	   did	  
enact	  some	  significant	  and	  progressive	  reforms.294	  The	  NDAA	  of	  2014	  will	  
provide	   a	   victim	   advocate	   to	   every	   service	   member	   who	   reports	   an	  
assault.295	   Additionally,	   it	   will	   also	   make	   it	   a	   crime	   to	   retaliate	   against	  
service	  members	   who	   report	   assaults,	   and	   it	   will	   prevent	   commanding	  
officers	   from	   overturning	   sexual	   assault	   verdicts.296	   The	   NDAA	   of	   2014	  
gives	   the	   armed	   services	   one	   year	   to	   implement	   the	   use	   of	   judge	  
advocates	   to	  conduct	  Article	  32	   investigations	  where	  practicable.297	  Any	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victim	  of	  a	  crime	  who	  suffers	  pecuniary,	  emotional,	  or	  physical	  harm	  and	  
is	  named	   in	  one	   the	  charges	  as	  a	  victim	  does	  not	  have	   to	   testify	  at	   the	  
Article	   32	   hearing.298	   Finally,	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   five-­‐year	   statute	   of	  
limitations	   on	   rape	   and	   sexual	   assault	   on	   adults	   and	   children	   under	  
Article	  120	  cases.299	  	  
	  
C. A	  Positive	  Half-­‐Step	  Forward	  
	  
The	  military	  justice	  system	  must	  adopt	  Senator	  Gillibrand’s	  idea	  to	  
take	   prosecution	   outside	   of	   the	   chain	   of	   command	   if	   service-­‐members	  
are	  to	  receive	  true	  and	  meaningful	  justice.	  The	  NDAA	  of	  2014	  is	  a	  massive	  
improvement,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  Making	  retaliation	  a	  crime	  is	  
a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  especially	  because	  the	  complaining	  party	  can	  
bring	  the	  claim	  directly	  to	  the	  Inspector	  General	  (“IG”)	  of	  their	  respective	  
military	  branch	  for	  an	  independent	  investigation	  of	  alleged	  retaliation.300	  
The	  IG	  of	  the	  specific	  branch	  will	  also	  be	  required	  to	  notify	  the	  IG	  of	  the	  
Department	   of	   Defense	   of	   the	   inquiry.301	   Therefore,	   because	   the	   IG	   is	  
several	   ranks	   above	   the	   immediate	   superior	   a	   victim	   would	   normally	  
consult	  about	  alleged	  retaliation,	  there	  is	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  an	  impartial	  
investigation	   and	   determination	   due	   to	   the	   IG’s	   lack	   of	   personal	  
relationships	   and	   therefore	   bias	   against	   or	   for	   the	   victim	   or	   accused.	  
However,	   victims	   may	   still	   fear	   ostracism	   and	   retaliation	   because	   now	  
instead	   of	   simply	   going	   to	   the	   teacher,	   they	   must	   go	   directly	   to	   the	  
principal.	  
The	   auxiliary	   legal	   assistance	   to	   sexual	   assault	   victims	   will	  
definitely	   benefit	   alleged	   victims	   by	   putting	   someone	   by	   their	   side	  
throughout	   the	   proceedings	   for	   emotional	   support	   and	   by	   providing	  
competent	   legal	   representation.302	   	   However,	   as	   mentioned	   supra,	   the	  
benefits	  of	  SVCs	  will	  largely	  be	  felt	  at	  trial	  because	  a	  judge	  knowledgeable	  
in	  the	  law	  can	  rule	  on	  objections.	   	  Certain	  victims	  named	  in	  charges	  but	  
                                                
298	  See	  Id.	  
299	  See	  Id.	  
300	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1714,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  1034	  (2014)).	  
301	  Id.	  	  
302	  NATIONAL	  DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  
1704,	  127	  Stat	  672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  846	  (b)(2014));	  NATIONAL	  
DEFENSE	  AUTHORIZATION	  ACT	  FOR	  FISCAL	  YEAR	  2014,	  PL	  113-­‐66,	  §	  1716,	  127	  Stat	  
672	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  1044e	  (2014)).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  341	  
not	   having	   to	   testify	   at	   Article	   32	   hearings	   will	   also	   ensure	   more	   just	  
outcomes	  and	  protect	  victim	  interests,	  assuming	  people	  “in	  the	  know”	  do	  
not	   gossip.	   Regarding	   legally	   trained	   judicial	   officers	   at	   pretrial	  
proceedings,	   hopefully,	   “whenever	   practicable”	   will	   turn	   out	   to	   mean	  
every	   time	   there	   is	   a	   pretrial	   proceeding.	   	   Overall,	   the	   passage	   of	   the	  
NDAA	   of	   2014	   was	   a	   substantial	   and	   very	   positive	   move	   in	   the	   right	  




A	   few	   weeks	   after	   the	   Naval	   Academy	   Article	   32	   hearing	  
concluded,	   a	   reporter	   from	   the	   Washington	   Post	   went	   to	   the	   Naval	  
Academy	   to	   interview	   the	   victim.303	   “As	   [the	   victim	   approached]	   the	  
Naval	  Academy	  gate	  to	  meet	  [the]	  reporter,	  the	  guard	  who	  had	  just	  been	  
so	   chatty	   and	   welcoming	   stop[ed]	   smiling.”304	   “No	   one	   acts	   like	   they	  
know	  her	  anymore;	  no	  one	  speaks	  or	  even	  looks	  her	  way	  as	  she	  crosses	  
the	  campus.”305	  During	  the	   interview,	  the	  victim	  said	  that	   the	  questions	  
she	  was	  asked	  at	  a	  public	  preliminary	  hearing	   in	  the	  case—whether	  she	  
wore	  underwear	  to	  the	  party,	  for	  instance—“were	  more	  humiliating	  than	  
[she]	   could	   have	   imagined.”306	   The	   victim	   told	   the	   reporter	   that	  
regardless	   of	   the	   case’s	   disposition,	   she	   intends	   to	   finish	  her	   remaining	  
seven	   months	   at	   the	   academy	   and	   become	   a	   commissioned	   officer,	  
despite	   what	   the	   victim	   calls	   her	   “complete	   and	   total	   isolation”	   on	  
campus.307	   The	   victim	   believes	   that	   that	   “If	   someone	   committed	   a	  
heinous	  crime,	  they	  should	  be	  held	  accountable.”308	  Additionally,	  last	  fall,	  
the	  young	  woman	  was	  required	  to	  attend	  football	  games	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	   cheerleading	   team,	   where	   some	   of	   the	   cheers	   were	   directed	   at	  
her.309	   Since	   the	   case	  made	   the	   news,	   she	   no	   longer	   has	   to	   attend	   the	  
games.310	   The	   victim	   believes	   that	   that	   “[i]f	   someone	   committed	   a	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heinous	   crime,	   they	   should	   be	   held	   accountable.”311	   Anytime	   someone	  
walks	   in	   and	   sees	   the	   victim	   sitting	   in	   the	   café,	   they	   turn	   their	   head	   in	  
avoidance.312	  Prior	  to	  this	  case,	  the	  victim	  was	  a	  popular	  cheerleader	  who	  
“used	  to	   interact	  with	   lots	  of	  people”	  but	  after	  the	  pretrial	  hearing,	  she	  
said	  she	  had	  to	  write	  off	  having	  a	  social	  life.313	  The	  victim’s	  boyfriend	  told	  
the	  reporter	  “[s]he	  still	   flashes	  back	  to	  a	  defense	  lawyer	  asking	  her	  how	  
she	  ‘performs	  certain	  activities’	  —	  oral	  sex,	  she	  means,	  and	  can’t	  believe	  
it.”314	  	  
“The	  fundamental	  requirement	  of	  due	  process	  is	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  be	  heard	  at	  a	  meaningful	   time	  and	   in	  a	  meaningful	  manner.”315	   	  This	  
Naval	  Academy	  victim	  was	  denied	  due	  process.	  The	  military	  needs	  reform	  
that	   will	   ensure	   that	   both	   the	   accused	   and	   the	   accuser	   are	   afforded	  
meaningful	   justice.	   Article	   32	   hearings	   are	   supposed	   to	   determine	  
probable	  cause	  so	  that	   justice	   is	  served.	   Instead,	   they	  are	  used	  to	  scare	  
victims	   into	   silence	   and	   isolation.	   Although	   Article	   32	   hearings	   are	   not	  
trials,	   they	  are	  equally	   as	   important.	   If	   the	   IO	  does	  not	  believe	   there	   is	  
probable	   cause,	   the	   accused	   will	   not	   be	   tried,	   and	   the	   victim	   will	   be	  
denied	   justice.	  Without	   a	   victim’s	   complete	   and	   accurate	   testimony	   of	  
what	   occurred,	   probable	   cause	   will	   most	   likely	   be	   lacking,	   and	   the	  
accused	  will	  not	  be	  adjudicated.	   If	  defense	  counsel	  can	  make	  the	  victim	  
recant,	   not	   because	   the	   victim	   is	   lying,	   but	   because	   defense	   counsel	   is	  
abusing	  the	  victim	  on	  the	  witness	  stand,	  the	  victim	  will	  never	  get	  his	  or	  
her	  day	  in	  court.	  	  
Substantial	   progress	   will	   be	   made	   if	   MRE	   412’s	   procedural	  
requirements	   are	   enforced.	   This	   does	   not	   require	   committee	  meetings,	  
bill	   drafting,	   or	   any	   additional	   legislative	   energy.	   The	   rules	   are	   already	  
written—they	  just	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  enforced.	  How	  can	  service-­‐
members	  be	  denied	  the	  same	  protections	  afforded	  to	  American	  civilians,	  
when	  service-­‐members	  are	  the	  one’s	  sacrificing	  their	  time	  and	  their	  lives	  
to	   ensure	   that	   our	   country’s	   democratic	   and	   judicial	   values	   are	  
protected?	  “Bitter	  experience	  has	  sharpened	  our	  realization	  that	  a	  major	  
test	   of	   true	   democracy	   is	   the	   fair	   administration	   of	   justice.”316	   “If	   the	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conditions	   for	  a	   society	  of	   free	  men	   formulated	   in	  our	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  are	  
not	   to	   be	   turned	   into	  mere	   rhetoric,	   independent	   and	   impartial	   courts	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